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NOTES 
Changing the Rules of the GaIDe: Pension Plan Terminations 
and Early Retirement Benefits 
The Employee Retirement' Income Security Act of 1974 ("ER-
ISA")1 was the first comprehensive federal legislation to regulate pri-
vate pension plans.2 As one part of its extensive regulatory scheme, 
ERISA permits employers to terminate their pension plans when spec-
ified conditions exist. 3 Upon termination of a defined benefit pension 
plan, 4 ERISA requires the employer to pay certain designated benefits 
to employees.5 However, section 4044(d)(1)6 allows the employer to 
retain any excess assets as a reversion if: 
(A) all liabilities of the plan to participants and their beneficiaries 
have been satisfied, 
(B) the distribution does not contravene any provision of law, and 
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("BRISA"), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, and 42 U.S.C.), 
2. Prior to ERISA, Congress had passed only three statutes regulating private pensions: The 
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1982) (original version at 
ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)); the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 3 
(1954) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9602 (1982)); and the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958), repealed by BRISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
§ 1 IO(a), 88 Stat. 829, 851 (1974). For the history and coverage of those three statutory schemes, 
see generally Note, Reversion of Surplus Pension Assets Upon Plan Termination: ls It Consistent 
with the Purpose of ERISA?, 62 IND. L.J. 805, 808 (1987). 
3. ERISA §§ 4042, 4044, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (1982). 
4. This Note discusses whether ERISA requires payment of early retirement benefits upon 
plan termination in the context of defined benefit plans as opposed to defined contribution plans. 
In a defined benefit plan, the employer must contribute to the plan whatever funds are necessary 
to pay a certain benefit to the employee. The employer calculates the benefit in a manner estab-
lished by the plan. 1 G. BOREN, QUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS at § 1.07 
(1983). Therefore, the employer assumes the investment risk. 
In the alternative type of plan allowed by ERISA - defined contribution plans - employers 
contribute fixed amounts to participant accounts and, upon retirement, participants receive the 
value of the account. Id. at § 1.16. Thus in a defined contribution plan, the employee bears the 
investment risk. 
Another difference between defined benefit and defined contribution plans is in how the bene-
fits are paid. Defined benefit plan benefits are usually paid as a lifetime pension. Defined contri-
bution plan benefits are usually paid as a lump sum. Grubbs, Termination of Pension Plans With 
Asset Reversion: A Solution, 10 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 199, 199-200 (1984). 
The recent trend has been toward defined benefit plans. In 1950, 11.6% of all private plan 
assets were in defined benefit plans. By 1980, this percentage had increased to 27.8%. Ippolito, 
Issues Surrounding Pension Terminations for Reversions, 5 AM. J. TAX POLY. 81, 93 (1986). And 
in 1986, 58% of employers in all industries had a defined benefit plan while 43% had a defined 
contribution plan. REsEARCH CENTER, EcoNOMIC POLICY DIVISION, u. s. CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 1986 21 (1986). 
5. ERISA § 4044(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982) governs distribution of these benefits. 
6. ERISA § 4044(d)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(l) (1982). 
1034 
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(C) the plan provides for such a distribution in these circumstances.7 
This Note examines whether early retirement benefits are included 
among the liabilities that an employer must satisfy before that em-
ployer can receive a reversion of excess assets. 8 Part I reviews the 
background of plan terminations and how they affect early retirement 
benefits. It also discusses the general structure of ERISA. Part II ex-
amines the controversy surrounding whether ERISA's definition of 
"accrued benefits" includes early retirement benefits. ERISA requires 
that employees receive all of their accrued benefits before the employ-
ers receive any reversions. However, the circuits have disagreed as to 
whether early retirement benefits are accrued benefits and, therefore, 
covered by this requirement. Even if early retirement benefits are not 
accrued benefits, an alternative theory suggests that the distribution 
requirements of section 4044(a)(6)9 require payment of those benefits 
to employees. Part III analyzes the requirements of ERISA section 
4044(a)(6). Section 4044(a) establishes a priority scheme for distribu-
7. ERISA § 4044(d)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(l) (1982). 
8. The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 ("REA"), § 301(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1451, codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 1054(g) (Supp. IV 1986), clarified that employers may not reduce early retirement bene-
fits or retirement-type subsidies for plan participants who eventually meet the original require-
ments for those benefits. However, this does not assist participants who are deprived of the 
opportunity to gain additional required years of service because, for example, their plant has 
closed or their employer has gone out of business. Also, REA does not affect any plan amend-
ments or terminations made prior to August l, 1984 for nonunion plans or January 1, 1985 for 
union plans. REA § 302(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. IV 1986). In fact, the Senate Finance 
Committee's report states that "no inference is to be made on the basis of this clarification as to 
the scope of the prohibition before the effective date of the provision." S. REP. No. 575, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2547, 2574. The issue 
remains important even if limited to nonunion plan terminations prior to August 1, 1984 and 
union plan terminations prior to January l, 1985. Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit's decision in 
Tilley v. Mead Corp., 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988), which 
required payment of early retirement benefits under a plan terminated before the effective date of 
REA); (see infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text), a number of plaintiffs have filed class 
action suits based on plan terminations that occurred prior to August l, 1984. See, e.g., Charles-
ton Natl. Bank v. Hechts Inc., No. 87-0173 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va.), cited in Brief of the American 
Academy of Actuaries as Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioner, at 10, Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 
815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted 109 S. Ct. 52 (Oct. 3, 1988) (No. 87-1868); No. 87-
C167-R (W.D. Va. April 24, 1987), cited in Brief of the American Academy of Actuaries as 
Amicus Curiae, at 10, Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 109 S. 
Ct. 52 (1988) (No. 87-1868). Furthermore, if adopted, the Blessitt approach (Blessit v. Retire-
ment Plan for Employees of Dixie Engine Co., 817 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1987) (requiring em-
ployer to pay early retirement benefits for years of service that the employees might have worked 
iftheir plan had not terminated) (discussed at notes 138-46, infra, and accompanying text) might 
affect asset allocation in spinoffs and transfers of assets. Coleman, From Amato to Blessitt: Out 
of the Frying Pan, into the Fire, 15 TAX MGMT. CoMPENSATION PLAN. J. (BNA) 343 (1987) .. 
This Note primarily addresses the·problem in the context of plan terminations that occurred 
prior to the effective date of the relevant REA provisions. The policy implications discussed in 
Part IV also apply to the current debate over the advisability of continuing to allow reversions. 
For a general discussion of plan terminations see Note, Penslon Plan Terminations and A~et 
Reversions: Accommodating the Interests of Employers and Employees, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 
257 (1985). 
9. ERISA § 4044(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(6) (1982). See infra text accompanying note 11 
for the relevant language of ERISA § 4044(a)(6). 
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tion of assets upon plan termination. The distribution scheme is com-
posed of six categories, 10 the last of which allocates assets "to all other 
benefits under the plan." 11 The circuits are split as to whether cate-
gory six of section 4044(a) covers employees' benefit expectations in-
cluding early retirement benefits. Part IV explores the public policy 
considerations relevant to the issue of whether BRISA should require 
employers to pay early retirement benefits prior to receiving a rever-
sion of excess assets. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE PROBLEM AND AN OVERVIEW OF BRISA 
A. Reversions: The ''Problem,, 
Between 1980 and 1987, employers terminated 1,635 plans with 
reversions of $1 million or more. 12 These terminations resulted in dis-
tribution of approximately $22 billion to 1.8 million employees, 13 
yielding on average $12,222.22 per employee. During the same period 
of time, employers received more than $18 billion from plan termina-
tions, or 45% of the total, in residual asset reversions. 14 This works 
out to an average of $11,009,174 for each employer per plan termi-
nated. Thus, terminations of benefit plans may greatly enrich the 
corporation. 
Not only do plan terminations allow employers to receive large 
amounts of employee benefit plan assets, the terminations may result 
in nonpayment of early retirement benefits. For employees who ex-
pected to receive these benefits, this amounts to "chang[ing] the rules 
10. Categories one and two require that the distribution first return participant contributions. 
Category three mandates payment of annuities next. Category four provides for payment of 
basic benefits, at least up to a statutory maximum. Category five requires distribution of most 
remaining nonforfeitable benefits. ERISA § 4044(a)(l).(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(l)-(5) (1982). 
See infra note 152 for the relevant text of§ 4044(a). 
11. ERISA § 4044(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(6) (1982). 
12. Brief for the Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner 
at 3, Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988) (Oct. 
3, 1988) (No. 87-1868). Note that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") does 
not even attempt to keep statistics on reversions of less than $1 million. However, the PBGC did 
estimate that excess assets existed in at least 4,800 of the 6,800 plans terminated during 1986. Id. 
at 3. Nor is there any indication of whether any of the terminated plans were multi-employer 
plans. My breakdown of the statistics assumes not. While generally the scope of this Note is 
limited to pre-REA, large reversions remain an issue and I have therefore included post-REA 
data in this discussion of the problem. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. There is a tremendous incentive to plunder these plans. "Overfunded pension plans 
have become an 'irresist[i]ble unguarded bank vault' to employers .•.. " Terminations ta Recap-
ture Excess Assets Are Contrary ta Spirit a/ ER/SA, Lantas Says, 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1696 (Oct. 
3, 1988) (quoting Rep. Tom Lantos). Retirement plans continue to be overfunded even after 
Black Monday. See id. The large dollar amounts at stake provide a significant incentive for 
employers to terminate plans. Generally the only way an employer can get access to the excess 
assets is by terminating the plan. Grubbs, supra note 4, at 201. Interestingly, pension plan 
overfunding is not limited to the United States. A similar issue exists in England. See generally 
Nobles, Who is Entitled ta the Pension Fund Surplus?, 16 INDUS. L. J. 164 (1987). 
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of the game."15 Many defined benefit plans offer some type of early 
retirement option.16 Typical early retirement plans provide that em-
ployees may retire, with favorable benefits, before the plan's normal 
retirement age. 17 However, to retire under an early retirement plan, 
employees usually must meet specified criteria, often a minimum age, 
a minimum service requirement, or both.18 When employers termi-
nate plans, employees who do not meet the minimum requirements, 
but who expect to meet these requirements in the future, often lose the 
opportunity to receive the early retirement benefits that they antici-
pated. For example, in many plant closings the workers' employment 
terminates and the employer does not offer alternative employment. 
At the time of the plant closing the employer will often terminate the 
retirement plan. Whether or not BRISA requires employers to pay 
early retirement benefits to employe~ before that employer may re-
ceive a reversion of excess plan assets will determine whether the em-
ployees receive any of their anticipated early retirement benefits. 
B. General Background on ER/SA 
Congress promulgated BRISA in an attempt to protect employees' 
entitlements to benefits under existing retirement plans and to en-
courage institution of new, expanded plans.19 BRISA's provisions ap-
ply, with only limited exceptions, 20 to any employee benefit plan 
sponsored by employers, employee organizations, or jointly sponsored 
plans, where the employer or employees are "engaged in commerce or 
15. Ashenbaugh v. Crucible, Inc., 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516, 1538 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (Mansmann, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Pension Asset Raids: Hearings 
Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1983) (comments of Arthur 
Williams III)). 
16. J. GEE, PENSIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 1[ 240.1 (2d ed. 1987). 
17. Normal retirement age is the age, "as established by a plan, when retirement normally 
occurs." EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS 90 (J. Lehman 6th ed. 1987) 
[hereinafter GLOSSARY]. ERISA requires that this age be not more than the later of age 65 or 
ten years of plan participation. ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (1982). 
18. J. GEE, supra note 16, at 1[ 240.1. 
19. The House report states that Congress designed ERISA to: 
(1) establish equitable standards of plan administration; 
(2) mandate minimum standards of plan design with respect to the vesting of plan benefits; 
(3) require minimum standards of fiscal responsibility by requiring the amortization of un· 
funded liabilities; 
(4) insure the vested portion of unfunded liabilities against the risk of premature plan ter-
mination; and 
(5) promote a renewed expansion of private retirement plans and increase the number of 
participants receiving private retirement benefits. 
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 4639, 4640. 
20. The act provides exceptions for governmental plans, church plans, plans maintained 
solely to comply with workers' compensation or unemployment compensation statutes, foreign 
plans primarily benefiting nonresident aliens and unfunded excess benefit plans. ERISA § 4(b), 
29 u.s.c. § 1003(b) (1982). 
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in any industry or activity affecting commerce."21 Congress organized 
BRISA into four titles. Title I provides definitions, scope, and admin-
istrative requirements, as well as remedies arid penalties. Title II pri-
marily contains Internal Revenue Code amendments. Title III 
designates agency authority for the implementation and administra-
tion of BRISA. Title IV covers the termination of pension plans, cre-
ates the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") and 
outlines the benefit insurance program.22 
Congress divided responsibility for administering BRISA between 
the Department of Labor, the PBGC, and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice ("IRS"). 23 The Department of Labor received primary authority 
over fiduciary standards, including prohibited transactions.24 The 
PBGC governs administration of plan terminations and the termina-
tion insurance program.25 The IRS supervises ERISA's minimum 
standards for participation, 26 vesting, 27 and funding. 2s 
II. EARLY RETIREMENT BENEFITS AS ACCRUED BENEFITS 
This Part shows that it is unclear whether BRISA requires em-
21. ERISA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1982). 
22. 1 G. BOREN, supra note 4, at § 1.04. 
23. Reorganization Plan No. 4 modified the original division of agency responsibility. Reorg. 
Plan No. 4of1978, 3 C.F.R. 332 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1163 (1982) and in 92 Stat. 
3790 (1978). This Note refers to the division of authority as it currently exists. Coordination of 
agency functions remains a problem and some commentators have suggested consolidation of all 
ERISA responsibility into one agency. See generally Klimkowsky & Lanoff, ERJSA Enforce-
ment: Mandate for a Single Agency, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 89 (1985). 
24. Klimkowsky & Lanoff, supra note 23, at 95. 
25. Id. at 89 n.2. 
26. "An employee who is getting credit towards the contributions or benefits provided under 
the plan is called 'participant,' and is said to be 'covered' by the plan." 1 G. BOREN, supra note 
4, at 3:02. 
27. Vesting is the method by which an employee's accrued benefit becomes nonforfeitable. 1 
G. BOREN, supra note 4, at§ 3:09. See also GLOSSARY, supra note 17, at 140 ("An employee's 
right to receive a present or future pension benefit vests when it is no longer contingent upon his 
remaining in the service of the employer."). The entire accrued benefit may become nonforfeit-
able at the same point in time. Alternatively, the employee's benefit may vest by increasing 
percentages. 1 G. BOREN, supra note 4, at § 3.09. 
28. Klimkowsky & Lanoff, supra note 23, at 95. In a funded defined benefit plan, the em-
ployer contributes enough on a regular basis to meet the projected cost of paying the offered 
benefits. J. GEE, supra note 16, at 11240.2. See also GLOSSARY, supra note 17, at 58 (A funded 
retirement plan is a "plan under which funds are set aside in advance to pay expected benefits."). 
An actuary calculates the amount of the necessary contribution, taking into account plan experi-
ence and projections on compensation, turnover and investment income. The employer receives 
a tax deduction for necessary contributions. J. GEE, supra note 16, at 11240.2. These employer 
contributions result in a funded plan. Ensuring at least a minimal level of funding was one of 
Congress' goals in passing ERISA. See supra note 19 for the statement of congressional purpose 
contained in the House Report. 
By comparison, in unfunded plans employers must pay the benefits out of the general corpo-
rate treasury when the benefits become due. Plans offering these kinds of benefits exist only 
infrequently. Unfunded plans are seldom qualified under ERISA since they do not meet mini-
mum funding requirements. 
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ployers to pay all accrued benefits upon plan termination. The circuits 
are in conflict on the question of whether early retirement benefits are 
accrued benefits. The Second Circuit has stated that early retirement 
benefits are accrued;29 the Third Circuit has held that early retirement 
benefits are not accrued. 30 The Fourth Circuit has held that early re-
tirement benefits may or may not be accrued, depending on two vari-
ables: (1) whether the benefits are funded or unfunded; and (2) 
whether they are contingent or non-contingent.31 Both the statute and 
legislative history contain ambiguous language. Therefore, the courts 
on each side of the circuit split quote identical provisions in support of 
their opposite holdings. 32 
The regulations of the IRS and PBGC do not clearly resolve this 
issue either - they arguably conflict both with themselves and with 
each other. However, the IRS has interpreted accrued benefits as in-
cluding early retirement benefits that were funded and non-contingent. 
The PBGC has declined to take a position on the issue. 
A. ERISA 's Requirement That All Accrued Benefits Be Paid upon 
Plan Termination 
Section 4044(d)(l) allows employers to keep reversions only after 
satisfying all liabilities. Accrued benefits constitute liabilities because 
I.R.C. section 41 l(d)(3) provides that when an employer terminates a 
plan, "the rights of all affected employees to benefits accrued to the 
date of such termination ... to the extent funded as of such date ... 
are nonforfeitable."33 Section 403(d)(l) requires that "[u]pon termina-
tion of a pension plan ... the assets of the plan shall be allocated in 
accordance with the provisions of section 4044."34 Section 4044(a) 
provides for payment of all nonforfeitable benefits.35 I.R.C. section 
401(a)(2) provides that plan assets must first be used to satisfy "all 
liabilities with respect to employees."36 The key issue in interpreting 
and administering this language is whether any given benefit is an "ac-
crued benefit." 
29. Amato v. Western Union Intl., Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1414 (2d Cir. 1985), cert dismissed 
per stipulation, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986). 
30. Bencivenga v. Western Pa. Teamsters and Employers Pension Fund, 763 F.2d 574, 580 
(3d Cir. 1985). 
31. Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. of Natl. Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1983), cert 
denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984) (unfunded, contingent benefits are not accrued benefits). Collins v. 
Seafarers Pension Trust, 846 F.2d 936, 938 (4th Cir. 1988) (benefits that were funded and non-
contingent are accrued benefits). 
32. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97 and 99-106. 
33. I.R.C. § 41l(d)(3) (1982). For a further discussion of relevant statutory provisions see 
infra text accompanying notes 158-63. 
34. ERISA § 403(d)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(d)(l) (1982). 
35. See infra text accompanying notes 158-63. 
36. I.R.C. § 40l(a)(l) (1982). 
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B. The Circuit Court Disagreement 
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit court of appeals to deal 
with the issue of payment of early retirement benefits upon plan ter-
mination. In Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division of National Steel Corp., 37 
the court held that unfunded, contingent early retirement benefits are 
not accrued benefits and therefore did not require the employer to pay 
them upon plan termination. The Third Circuit followed Sutton in 
Bencivenga v. Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Pension 
Fund, 38 and Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc., 1975 Salaried Retirement 
Plan. 39 However, in Amato v. Western Union International, Inc., 40 the 
Second Circuit stated that non-contingent early retirement benefits are 
accrued benefits. Collins v. Seafarers Pension Trust, 41 decided by a dis-
trict court in the Fourth Circuit, distinguished Sutton and held that 
where the early retirement benefits are funded and are not contingent, 
the benefits are accrued. The Fourth Circuit recently affirmed, albeit 
in dicta, the district court's reasoning regarding accrued benefits.42 In 
Tilley v. Mead Corp., 43 another case involving termination of a plan 
that had offered early retirement benefits, the Fourth Circuit did not 
reach this argument. The Supreme Court is hearing Tilley this term 
and may address this issue. 
In Sutton v. Weirton Steel Division of National Steel Corp., 44 em-
ployees sued to prevent a plan change which eliminated unfunded, 
contingent early retirement benefits. The plan change was part of an 
anticipated employee buyout of the Weirton Steel Division of National 
Steel Corporation ("National"). National agreed to continue the early 
retirement program for five years from the date of the sale. At that 
point the early retirement plan would be terminated. The benefits at 
issue were unusual because they were only to be paid in the event of a 
plant shutdown or layoff. 45 For this reason the benefits were contin-
gent. Also, the benefits were unfunded as they would have been paya-
ble directly from National's corporate treasury.46 The court held that 
37. 724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984). 
38. 763 F.2d 574, 580 (3d Cir. 1985). 
39. 854 F.2d 1516, 1526 (3d Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S. Dec. 
13, 1988) (No. 88-897). 
40. 773 F.2d 1402, 1414 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986). 
41. 641 F. Supp. 293 (D.Md. 1986), later opin., 660 F. Supp. 386 (1987), revd. on other 
grounds, 846 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1988). 
42. Collins, 846 F.2d 936, 938 (4th Cir. 1988). 
43. 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted. 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988). For a discussion of 
Tilley, see infra text accompanying notes 134-37. 
44. 724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983). 
45. 724 F.2d at 409. 
46. 724 F.2d at 409. 
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such unfunded, contingent benefits were ancillary47 and therefore not 
accrued.48 
In Bencivenga v. Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers 
Pension Fund, 49 an employee challenged the pension plan's right to 
raise the discount factor applied to equalize the benefits elected by an 
employee retiring at an early age with those the employee would have 
received had he waited until normal retirement age. Application of 
the revised discount factor resulted in Bencivenga receiving a monthly 
pension benefit of $319, compared to the $440 per month which he 
had expected. so The court relied on the language of BRISA, legisla-
tive history, case law, and administrative regulations to reach its hold-
ing that early retirement benefits are not accrued benefits and that 
therefore BRISA does not prohibit this type of modification.51 The 
court believed that the plain meaning of BRISA's definition of accrued 
benefits as those "expressed in the form of an annual benefit commenc-
ing at normal retirement age"52 was that only normal retirement bene-
fits may be accrued benefits. The court also pointed to legislative 
history which, it asserted without e~planation, supported its view of 
BRISA's plain meaning. 53 The court next relied on Sutton without 
explaining why the Sutton court's rationale regarding unfunded, con-
tingent benefits would be applicable to the funded, non-contingent 
benefits at issue. 54 
Finally, the court reviewed two seemingly contradictory IRS regu-
Jations. One regulation, which prohibited decreases of accrued bene-
fits, stated that "[p ]Ian provi~ions indirectly affecting accrued benefits 
include ... actuarial factors for determining optional or early retire-
ment benefits. " 55 The court noted that the IRS had issued a revenue 
ruling indicating that such a change in the discount factor violated this 
regulation. 56 The court decided that this interpretation of early retire-
ment benefits as accrued benefits was not controlling because "unlike 
authorized regulations, revenue rulings; as interpretive actions, do not 
have the force of law and we need not accept the full breadth of the 
47. The House report on BRISA excluded "certain ancillary benefits." H.R. REP. No. 807, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4726. 
48. 724 F.2d at 410. 
49. 763 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1985). 
50. 763 F.2d at 575. 
51. 763 F.2d at 576-80. 
52. 763 F.2d at 577 (quoting BRISA § 3(23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (1982)). 
53. 763 F.2d at 577. 
54. 763 F.2d at 577-78. 
55. Treas. Reg. § l.4ll(d)-3(b) (1977) (emphasis added). 
56. 763 F.2d at 580. A revenue ruling is "[a]n interpretation by the Service that has been 
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin ..• for the information and guidance of taxpayers, 
Internal Revenue Service officials, and others concerned." BITIKER & McMAHON, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 1142.5 (1988) (quoting Rev. Proc. 88-1, § 4.07, 1988-1 IRB 
7). 
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IRS's theory."57 The concurrence placed special emphasis on the fact 
that this regulation included the word "indirectly."58 
A second, conflicting regulation stated that: 
In general, the term 'accrued benefits' refers only to pension or retire-
ment benefits. Consequently, accrued benefits do not include ancillary 
benefits not directly related to retirement benefits .... For purposes of 
this paragraph a subsidized early retirement benefit which is provided by 
a plan is not taken into account, except to the extent of determining the 
normal retirement benefit under the plan . . . . 59 
The court found that the original discount factor ·resulted in benefits 
which exceeded the normal early retirement benefit. It held that this 
excess was a subsidy and clearly unprotected by the second 
regulation. 60 
In Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc., 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 61 
the employer had closed a plant and terminated the employees. Con-
sequently the workers were prevented not only from gaining addi-
tional years of credited service but also from working for the company 
until they reached a designated minimum retirement age. This, in 
turn, caused a partial plan termination. 62 A group of former employ-
ees sued, claiming, among other things, entitlement to the early retire-
ment benefits offered under the company's thirty year benefit plan 
though they had not yet met all of the technical requirements of the 
plan such as attainment of a minimum age and number of years of 
service because the employer had made it impossible for them to meet 
those requirements. 63 In making this decision, the majority found it 
unnecessary to decide the issue of whether the early retirement bene-
fits in dispute were accrued, but stated, in dicta, that the court would 
continue to follow Bencivenga and therefore those benefits were not 
accrued benefits. 64 
However, in Amato v. Western Union International, Inc., 65 the Sec-
ond Circuit stated that the early retirement benefits at issue were ac-
57. 763 F.2d at 580. 
58. 763 F.2d at 581. 
59. Treas. Reg. § l.411(a)-7(a)(l)(ii) (1977). 
60. 763 F.2d at 580. 
61. 854 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir. 1988). 
62. 854 F.2d at 1518. 
63. 854 F.2d at 1520-21. 
64. 854 F.2d at 1525-26. 
65. 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985). Although it explicitly stated that the benefits at issue were 
accrued, the court remanded for a determination of whether MCI or Western Union had actually 
withdrawn early retirement assets from the plan. The Amato court's finding that the early retire-
ment benefits were accrued was in the context of a plan amendment as opposed to a plan termi-
nation. 773 F.2d at 1414. In fact, the Blessit en bane court distinguished Amato on that basis in 
the context of an alternative line of argument. Blessit v. Retirement Plan for employees of Dixie 
Engine Co., 848 F.2d 1164,1174-75 (11th Cir. 1988). See infra text accompanying notes 138-46 
for a discussion of Blessit. However, the Amato court's reasoning seems applicable to plan termi-
nations. See infra note 137. 
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crued benefits. In Amato, employees challenged their employer's 
pension plan modification. Microwave Maintenance Corporation and 
M.C.I. Communications Corporation (collectively "MCI"), had re-
cently acquired their subsidiary, Western Union. Since at least the 
1950s, Western Union's pension plan had provided various options 
which allowed employees to retire with full pension benefits prior to 
age sixty-five.66 In 1982, MCI and Western Union eliminated all of 
the favorable early retirement options. 67 Most of the plaintiffs had 
more than twenty years of service prior to the plan modification and 
expected to receive the unreduced early retirement benefits upon at-
tainment of the minimum age. 6s 
The employees based their claims on section 204(g)69 and I.R.C. 
section 41 l(d)(6)70 which prohibit an employer from reducing accrued 
benefits by plan amendment. The issue then became whether or not 
the eliminated benefits were accrued benefits. Relying on "the lan-
guage, purpose and legislative history of the statute,"71 the court held 
that the early retirement benefits were accrued benefits. The court first 
looked to the statutory language of BRISA section 3(23) which defines 
accrued benefits as those "expressed in the form of an annual benefit 
commencing at normal retirement age .... "72 In Amato the original 
plan provided that the same formula be used to calculate both early 
retirement benefits and age sixty-five retirement benefits. The court 
stated that a finding that the early retirement benefits were not ac-
crued benefits would be tantamount to reading the words "in the form 
of" out of the statute. The. court also reasoned that allowing too 
much freedom in defining accrued benefits would permit employers to 
undermine BRISA's purpose of "assuring employees that they would 
not be deprived of their reasonably-anticipated pension benefits."73 
The court rejected the district court's argument from a House re-
port on BRISA which stated that: 
In the case of a defined benefit plan the bill provides that the accrued 
benefit is to be determined under the plan, subject to certain require-
ments. The term "accrued benefit" refers to pension or retirement bene-
·fits and is not intended to apply to certain ancillary benefits, such as 
medical insurance or life insurance, which are sometimes provided for 
66. The less preferable early retirement plan alternative would have provided an actuarial 
reduction for the age differential between the employee's age at early retirement and age 65. 
67. 773 F.2d at 1405. , 
68. One of the eliminated provisions provided for unreduced retirement at age 55 for employ-
ees with at least 20 years of service. 773 F.2d at 1405. 
69. ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1982). This plan modification took place prior to 
the 1984 REA clarification discussed supra at note 8. 
70. I.R.C. § 411(d)(6) (1982). 
71. 773 F.2d at 1408. 
72. 773 F.2d at 1408 (quoting ERISA § 3(23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (1982)) (court's empha-
sis omitted). 
73. 773 F.2d at 1409. 
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employees in conjunction with a pension plan, and are sometimes pro-
vided separately. To require the vesting of these ancillary benefits would 
seriously complicate the administration and increase the cost of plans 
whose primary function is to provide retirement income. . . . Also, the 
accrued benefit to which the vesting rules apply is not to include such items 
as the value- of the right to receive benefits commencing at an age before 
normal retirement age .... 74 
The appeals court said that "the context demonstrates that Congress 
was not referring to unreduced early retirement benefits (which are not 
mentioned) but to benefits that are temporary or ancillary in 
nature."75 
Instead, the appeals court found persuasive the enactment of more 
recent legislation, the Retirement Equity Act of 198476 ("REA"). 
REA explicitly prohibited the elimination of early retirement benefits 
in circumstances like those in Amato. While REA was enacted by a 
different Congress from the one that enacted BRISA, its legislative 
history led the court to believe that the Senate viewed REA as simply 
"a codification of existing law as interpreted by IRS regulations."77 
The court found this convincing in spite of the fact that the Senate 
Finance Committee's report on REA indicated that "no inference is to 
be made on the basis of this clarification as to the scope of the prohibi-
tion before the effective date of the provision."78 The Amato court 
also noted the existence of an IRS determination letter, entitled to 
some deference, which stated that the plan amendment "impermissi-
74. 773 F.2d at 1409-10 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4726) (emphasis supplied by the court). The full 
section of the report stated: 
In the case of a defined benefit plan the bill provides that the accrued benefit is to be deter-
mined under the plan, subject to certain requirements. The term "accrued benefit" refers to 
pension or retirement benefits and is not intended to apply to certain ancillary benefits, such 
as medical insurance or life insurance, which are sometimes provided for employees in con-
junction with a pension plan, and are sometimes provided separately. To require the vesting 
of these ancillary benefits would seriously complicate the administration and increase the 
cost of plans whose primary function is to provide retirement income. Also, where the 
employee moves from one employer to another, the ancillary benefits (which are usually on 
a contingency basis) would often be provided by the new employer, whereas the new em-
ployer normally would not provide pension benefits based on service with the old employer. 
Also, the accroed benefit to which the vesting roles apply is not to include such items as the 
value of the right to, receive benefits commencing at an age before normal retirement age, or 
so-called social security supplements which are commonly paid in the case of early retire-
ment but then cease wheri the retiree attains the age at which he becomes entitled to receive 
current social security benefits, or any value in a plan's joint and survivor annuity provisions 
to the extent that exceeds the value of what the participant would be entitled to receive 
under a single life annuity. 
75. 773 F.2d at 1410. 
76. The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA), Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). See supra note 8 for a discussion of how 
REA affected an employer's duty to pay early retirement benefits. 
77. 773 F.2d at 1411. 
78. 773 F.2d at 1411 (quoting S. REP. No. 575, 93th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1984 
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2547, 2574). 
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bly affects accrued benefits."79 Finally, the court commented that case 
law did not provide much assistance. 80 
In Collins v. Seafarers Pension Trust, 81 employees sued the trustees 
and the pension fund of a.multi-employer plan to prevent elimination 
of "early normal pension" benefits. A district court in the Fourth Cir-
cuit held, on review of the defendants' motion to dismiss, that a 
funded and non-contingent "early retirement pension [that] is an inte-
grated part of a retirement plan, would fall within the scope of accrued 
benefits."82 While the court acknowledged that circuits had split on 
whether or not early retirement benefits are accrued benefits, the court 
looked to that part of the legislative history that states that ancillary 
benefits are not accrued benefits. The district court reasoned that the 
type of funded, non-contingent early retirement benefits at issue "more 
closely fits the category of pensions, it is not merely an ancillary bene-
fit. "83 The district court also used the funded, non-contingent nature 
of the benefits at issue to distinguish the case from Sutton where the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that unfunded and contingent 
benefits were not accrued benefits.84 On review, the appeals court 
agreed that the benefits were accrued benefits. 85 
Other cogent, although admittedly fact-specific, arguments for 
finding early retirement benefits to be accrued are found in Judge 
Mansmann's partial dissent in Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc., 1975 Sala-
ried Retirement Plan. 86 Judge Mansmann argued that the case was 
distinguishable from Bencivenga and that the thirty year benefits at 
issue in Ashenbaugh were accrued benefits in certain circumstances. 
He believed that where the employee had met the thirty year service 
requirement, that the employee's thirty year benefits had accrued even 
if the employee did not meet the minimum age requirement of sixty-
two at the time the plan terminated. He pointed out that, contrary to 
the facts in Bencivenga, the plan in Ashenbaugh was not ongoing with 
respect to the plaintiffs. Also, the thirty year benefit plan at issue in 
Ashenbaugh did not grant greater benefits to the employees than they 
would have received at normal retirement age. Therefore, Judge 
Mansmann found inapplicable the Bencivenga court's analysis that 
early retirement benefits constituted a subsidy. 87 Instead, at issue was 
79. 773 F.2d at 1412 (quoting the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8 n.4). 
80. 773 F.2d at 1413. 
81. 641 F. Supp. 293 (D.Md. 1986), later opin., 660 F. Supp. 386 (1987), revd. on other 
grounds, 846 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1988). 
82. 641 F. Supp. at 297. 
83. 641 F. Supp. at 297 (footnote omitted). 
84. 641 F. Supp. at 296. 
85. Collins v. Seafarers Pension Trust, 846 F.2d 936, 938 (4th Cir. 1988). 
86. 854 F.2d at 1533 (Mansmann, J., concurring and dissenting). 
87. The Bencivenga court had decided that such subsidies were ancillary benefits and were 
precluded from being accrued benefits by the House report, see supra text accompanying note 60. 
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a plan that had been terminated with respect to the plaintiffs and 
which gave benefits equal to the normal retirement benefits. Also, 
REA treats early retirement benefits as accrued benefits in some cir-
cumstances, and, like the court in Amato, Judge Mansmann believed 
that Congress simply codified existing law when it passed REA. Judge 
Mansmann also stated that the benefits should be treated as accrued in 
order to give effect to congressional intent and "as in Amato, to give 
the statutory language force and effect."88 Finally, Judge Mansmann 
pointed out that even if the early retirement benefits at issue were not 
accrued, the policies underlying BRISA would require their payment. 
He noted that Congress viewed pensions as deferred wages for work 
already performed by employees and that, therefore, allowing employ-
ers to retain the money that they contributed to fund early retirement 
benefit plans would result in unjustly enriching employers. 89 
The circuit courts are thus in conflict on the issue of whether early 
retirement benefits are accrued benefits. The Second Circuit, based on 
its reading of the statutory language, legislative history, and adminis-
trative regulations, held that early retirement benefits are included in 
BRISA's definition of accrued benefits.90 However, the Third Circuit, 
based on its interpretations of the same statutory language, legislative 
history, and administrative regulations, held that early retirement 
benefits are not accrued benefits.91 The Fourth Circuit bas relied on 
the same information to reach different conclusions depending on 
whether the benefits at issue are funded and non-contingent versus un-
funded and contingent. 92 Although all courts appear to base their de-
cisions on the statutory language, legislative history, administrative 
regulations, and agency interpretations, they have reached opposing 
results. In an attempt to clear up this confusion, the next section ana-
lyzes the applicable statutory language and legislative history. That is 
followed by Section D, which reviews the administrative regulations 
and the interpretations of the agencies responsible for enforcement. 
C. Statutory Language and Legislative History 
The definition of accrued benefits appears in BRISA section 3(23): 
(23) The term "accrued benefit" means-
(A) in the case of a defined benefit plan, the ~dividual's accrued 
88. 854 F.2d at 1534-35. 
89. 854 F.2d at 1537-38; see also infra text accompanying notes 231-36. 
90. Amato v. Western Union Intl., Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1414 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed 
per stipulation, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986). 
91. Bencivenga v. Western Pa. Teamsters and Employers Pension Fund, 763 F.2d 574, 580 
(3d Cir. 1985). 
92. Collins v. Seafarers Pension Trust, 846 F.2d 936, 938 (4th Cir. 1988) (benefits that were 
funded and non-contingent were accrued benefits); Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. of Natl. Steel 
Corp., 724 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984) (unfunded, contin-
gent benefits not accrued benefits). 
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benefit determined under the plan and, except as provided in 
section 1054(c)(3) of this title, expressed in the form of an an-
nual benefit commencing at normal retirement age .... 93 
In Bencivenga, the court used this language to support its conclusion 
that the early retirement benefits at issue were not accrued benefits. 
The court, in part, based its holding on the idea that "in the context of 
'accrued benefits,' ERISA's specific reference is to normal, rather than 
early, retirement."94 In contrast, the Amato court and Judge 
Mansmann in Ashenbaugh cited the very same statutory provision as 
supporting their conclusions that the early retirement benefits at issue 
in those cases were accrued benefits. The Amato court stated that "it 
is apparent that the 'form of' language . . . was designed to require 
that a plan assure a retiree of at least as much as an actuarially-re-
duced equivalent but not to permit the employer to deprive him of any 
more that might be provided-by the plan."95 In Ashenbaugh, Judge 
Mansmann cited with approval this portion of the Amato opinion.96 
Also confusing is the statute's circular reference to the employee's ac-
crued benefit when the statute allegedly defines "accrued benefit." 
Therefore, as the court noted in Shaw v. International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers Pension Plan, 97 this statutory defi-
nition provides little help in establishing a working definition of ac-
crued benefits. 
Neither does the legislative history resolve the issue. A key House 
report from the time of ERISA's passage states: 
The term "accrued benefit" refers to pension or retirement benefits 
and is not intended to apply to certain ancillary benefits, such as medical 
insurance or life insurance, which are sometimes provided for employees 
in conjunction with a pension plan, and are sometimes provided sepa-
rately. To require the vesting of these ancillary benefits would seriously 
complicate the administration and increase the cost of plans whose pri-
mary function is to provide retirement income. . . . Also, the accrued 
benefit to which the vesting rules apply is not to include such items as 
the value of the right to receive benefits commencing at an age before 
normal retirement age, or so-called social security supplements . . . . 98 
93. BRISA § 3(23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (1982). 
94. 763 F.2d at 577. 
95. 773 F.2d at 1408. 
96. 854 F.2d at 1535. 
97. 750 F.2d 1458, 1463 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985) ("The plain 
language of BRISA provides little help in determining whether the benefit at issue is an accrued 
benefit or not .•.. "). 
98. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 4670, 4726; see also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 
U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5054. The Conference Committee adopted similar 
language, stating that "the accrued benefit does not include the value of the right to receive early 
retirement benefits." Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3-4, Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 
1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988) (No. 87-1868) (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess., 1, 273, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5054). 
1048 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1034 
This passage has been subject to two opposing interpretations. The 
court in Amato believed that this report "sheds no light on the mean-
ing to be given to the term 'accrued benefit' " in the context of the 
early retirement benefits at issue in that case.99 Supportive of that 
view is the fact that health care insurance and life insurance are gener-
ally viewed differently by BRISA from pension benefits which provide 
income. For example, BRISA treats benefits like health care and life 
insurance separately as "welfare" benefits.100 Early retirement benefits 
are unlike welfare benefits in at least two respects. First, BRISA re-
quires employers to fund early retirement benefits as part of the em-
ployer's regular retirement plan funding. Employers do not fund 
welfare benefits on the same tax deferred basis.101 Second, early retire-
ment benefits pay a monthly income to employees, as do regular retire-
ment benefits. Welfare benefits generally do not. These differences 
seem to be behind the Collins court's finding that "funded, non-con-
tingent early retirement benefit[s] more closely fit[] the category of 
pensions, [they are] not merely ... ancillary benefit[s]."to2 Also, the 
report contrasts two types of benefits. The primary purpose of' one 
type is to provide retirement income while the other provides special-
ized, ancillary benefits. Again, it seems clear that early retirement 
benefits are more like the former than the latter.103 
In contrast, in Bencivenga and Ashenbaugh the courts relied on the 
same section of the House report to reach the diametrically opposite 
conclusion that early retirement benefits are "ancillary" benefits and 
thus not accrued.104 In Bencivenga, the court merely states that the 
report "indicates that the Act was not intended to assure the sanctity 
of early retirement expectations."105 In Ashenbaugh, the court notes 
that other courts have relied on this section when deciding claims to 
early retirement benefits. 106 
While the explicit mention of "early retirement benefits" in the Conference Committee report 
might remove some of the ambiguity associated with the House report, to date courts have fo-
cused exclusively on the House report. The petitioners in Tilley also noted that the Administra-
tion opposed including early retirement benefits among accrued benefits. Id. at 3. 
99. 773 F.2d at 1410. 
100. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982). Welfare benefits typically provide insurance 
types of coverage to employees and retirees. 
101. See Note, Unfunded Vacation Benefits, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1702, 1705 (1987). 
102. 641 F. Supp. at 296-7. 
103. This argument was made by the Third Circuit in Hoover v. Cumberland, Maryland 
Area Teamsters Pension Fund, 756 F.2d 977, 982 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 845 (1985). 
104. 763 F.2d at 580; 854 F.2d at 1526. 
105. 763 F.2d at 577. 
106. 854 F.2d at 1526, citing Shaw v. International Assn. of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers Pension Plan, 750 F.2d 1458, 1463 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985) 
(funded, post retirement pension increases are "accrued" and not "ancillary" but implying that 
early retirement benefits are "ancillary") and Petrella v. NL Indus., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1357 
(D.N.J. 1982) (holding that early retirement benefits as well as life insurance and major medical 
benefits are "ancillary" and not "accrued"). 
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D. IRS and PBGC Regulations 
The IRS has promulgated two seemingly conflicting regulations 
that deal with accrued benefits and early retirement benefits. Revenue 
rulings applying these regulations, however, consistently indicate that 
funded and non-contingent early retirement benefits are accrued bene-
fits. The IRS has interpreted its own regulations as defining early re-
tirement benefits as accrued benefits. The PBGC, on the other hand, 
has expressly refrained from taking a position on the issue.101 
Although courts should normally accord great deference to the inter-
pretation of the agencies that are respo~sible for ERISA administra-
tion, 108 the particular facts behind this issue make less deference 
appropriate. 
One IRS regulation provides that "[p]lan provisions indirectly af-
fecting accrued benefits include, for example, provisions relating ... to 
actuarial factors for determining optional or early retirement bene-
fits. " 109 The IRS clarified this regulation in an amicus brief in the 
Amato case110 by stating that "a plan amendment which eliminates 
unreduced early retirement benefits ... involves a change in the plan's 
actuarial factors that impermissibly affects accrued benefits."111 There 
is no reason to distinguish in this respect between plan amendments 
and plan terminations. In fact, in Tilley the employer was terminating 
the plan.112 Plan terminations have at least as disastrous an effect on 
early retirement benefits as the effect of plan amendments. 
However, another IRS regulation appears to be in conflict. It pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that: 
In general, the term 'accrued benefits' refers only to pension or retire-
ment benefits. Consequently, accrued benefits do not include ancillary 
benefits not directly related to retirement benefits. . . . For purposes of 
this paragraph a subsidized early retirement benefit which is provided by 
a plan is not taken into account, except to the extent of determining the 
normal retirement benefit under the plan .... 113 
107. Brief for the Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition at 
8, Mead Corp. v. Tillcw, 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988) (No. 
87-1868). 
108. See infra text accompanying notes 195-200. 
109. Treas. Reg§ 1.411(d)-3(b) (as amended in 1985) (emphasis added). 
110. Amato v. Western Union Intl. 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied per stipulation, 
474 U.S. 1113 (1986). 
111. 773 F.2d at 1412 (quoting from the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8 
n.4). 
112. 815 F.2d at 991; see also infra text accompanying note 136. 
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-7(a)(l)(ii) (as amended in 1985); see also the remarks of Repre-
sentative William Clay (D-Mo.): 
Since 1983, however, the IRS has appeared to soften its position to permit any assets above 
bare termination liability to revert to the employer, not just those assets that were mistak-
enly contributed to the plan. 
This broader definition of residual assets permits employers to strip out of the plan assets 
that are only artificially "excess." 
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Early retirement benefits have therefore been called "ancillary bene-
fits" based on this regulation. 114 As noted earlier, the relevant House 
report states that accrued benefits do not encompass "ancillary 
benefits."115 
The conflict in the applicable IRS regulations robs them of any 
determinative significance. However, the IRS seems to believe that, at 
least in some circumstances, early retirement benefits are accrued 
benefits. In an amicus curiae brief in Amato, the IRS argued that early 
retirement benefits are included in section 411 's definition of accrued 
benefits.116 At issue were funded, non-contingent benefits. In con-
trast, in .an amicus curiae brief in Tilley, the PBGC declined to take a 
position on the issue of whether funded, non-contingent benefits were 
accrued. 117 Normally courts should extend to the PBGC, the IRS, 
and the Department of Labor, the great deference typically accorded 
to the interpretation of the agencies responsible for administration of 
the statute being construed. 118 However, the courts should accord 
much less deference in cases where the agencies' interpretations are 
unclear and the agencies' own regulations are in disarray. 119 Courts 
also arguably owe less than the usual standard of deference to the 
IRS's interpretations of accrued benefits because the PBGC, not the 
IRS, is the agency charged specifically with administering plan termi-
nations.120 While explicitly recognizing the IRS's interpretation, the 
PBGC has declined to make any interpretation of its own. 121 There-
fore, some controversy remains as to whether early retirement benefits 
are accrued benefits as that term is used in BRISA. 
Before reviewing how public policy considerations affect the deter-
mination of this issue, Part III considers an alternative argument of-
fered for requiring employers to pay early retirement benefits prior to 
134 CoNG. R.Ec. E584 (daily ed. March 9, 1988) (statement of Rep. Clay). 
114. Ashenbaugh, 854 F.2d at 1527 ("[B]enefits like the [unfunded, conditional early retire· 
ment benefits at issue] are a retirement-type subsidy, and are therefore a benefit to which partici-
pants are not entitled unless relevant conditions are met.;'). But see Collins v. Seafarers Pension 
Trust, 641 F. Supp. 293 (D.Md. 1986), later opin., 660 F. Supp. 386 (1987), revd. on other 
grounds, 846 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1988). Under the description of House Report No. 807, "a 
funded, noncontingent early retirement benefit more closely fits the category of pensions, it is not 
merely an ancillary benefit." 660 F. Supp. at 296-97 (footnote deleted). For the relevant text of 
this report, see supra text accompanying note 74. 
115. For the relevant text of the House report see supra text accompanying note 74. 
116. 773 F.2d at 1412 (quoting from the Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8 
n.4). 
117. Brieffor the Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. asAmicus Curiae in Support of the Petition at 
8, Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987) (No. 87-1868), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 52 
(1988). 
118. See infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text. 
119. Cf. INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (courts do not owe height-
ened deference to agency interpretations that are inconsistent over time). 
120. See infra note 194 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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receiving any reversion - the terms of section 4044(a)(6). All of Part 
III rests on the assumption, arguendo, that early retirement benefits 
are not accrued benefits. 
III. DOES BRISA SECTION 4044(A)(6) REQUIRE PAYMENT OF 
EARLY RETIREMENT BENEFITS? 
The circuit courts are split on whether section 4044(a)(6) requires 
payment of early retirement benefits upon plan termination. Section 
4044(a) establishes a priority scheme for payment of plan assets when 
an employer terminates its pension plan, but the statutory language 
and the legislative history are ambiguous on the question of whether 
section 4044(a)(6) mandates distribution of assets in payment of early 
retirement benefits. Though the regulations themselves do not clearly 
resolve the problem, both the IRS and the PBGC believe that section 
4044(a)(6) does not mandate payment of early retirement benefits. 
A. The Cases 
The circuit courts are in conflict as to whether section 4044(a)(6) 
requires payment of early retirement benefits. In Amato v. Western 
Union International, Inc., 122 and Tilley v. Mead Corp., 123 the courts 
held that section 4044(a)(6) requires payment of early retirement bene-
fits. However, a unanimous Eleventh Circuit en bane decision in Bles-
sitt v. Retirement Plan for Employees of Dixie Engine Co., 124 held that 
section 4044(a)(6) does not require payment of early retirement bene-
fits based on anticipated future years of service. The en bane decision 
vacated a unanimous panel decision which had held that section 
4044(a)(6) does require payment of the benefits. And inAshenbaugh v. 
Crucible Inc., 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 125 the court held that 
section 4044(a)(6) does not mandate payment of early retirement 
benefits. 
In Amato v. Western Union International, Inc., 126 where employees 
challenged the right of MCI and Western Union to eliminate their 
pension plan's provisions for early retirement benefits, the court held 
that a withdrawal of early retirement benefit assets from the plan 
would have violated BRISA because the benefits had accrued. How-
ever, the court also stated, albeit in dicta, that section 4044(a)(6) 
would entitle the employees to early retirement benefits if MCI or 
Western Union had terminated the plan.127 It began its analysis by 
122. 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986). 
123. 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988). 
124. 848 F.2d 1164 (11th Cir. 1988) (en bane). 
125. 854 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir. 1988). 
126 .• 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985). See supra notes 65-80 an~ accompanying text. 
127. 773 F.2d at 1414-16. 
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interpreting the plain meaning of category six - "all benefits under 
the plan"128 - as applying to all benefits, not just accrued benefits. 
The court found support for its holding in a PBGC regulation which 
states that "[t]he benefits assigned to priority category [six] with re-
spect to each participant are all of the participant's benefits under the 
plan, whether forfeitable or nonforfeitable."129 The court then had to 
reconcile language of a PBGC comment to the effect that "priority 
category 6 will contain the value of accrued forfeitable benefits of a 
participant."130 Obviously not a believer in the maxim expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius, 131 the court did this by saying that the comment 
only indicates one type of benefit covered by category six but does not 
preclude the inclusion of other types of benefits. The court also stated 
its belief that the Conference Committee's act in changing the House 
version of the bill from "other accrued benefits" to "all other benefits 
under the Plan"132 was indicative of a congressional intent, "not to 
limit the allocation requirement to accrued benefits but to require that, 
as long as assets were available, they should be used to meet partici-
pants' benefit expectations based upon the Plan's full benefit 
structure."133 
In Tilley v. Mead Corp., 134 employees challenged the right of their 
employer, Mead Corporation, to use a "normal retirement" reduction 
instead of an "early retirement" reduction in calculating benefits upon 
plan termination.135 The normal retirement reduction which Mead 
used took the normal retirement age of sixty-five as the starting point 
and then reduced the benefit to a present value based on the em-
ployee's age at the time of plan termination. The early retirement re-
duction, which the employees requested, would have taken the early 
retirement age of sixty-two as the base and then reduced to a present 
value based on the employee's age at the time of plan termination. 
The total difference for the six plaintiffs amounted to $56,476.92. The 
court reviewed the Second Circuit's reasoning in Amato and relied on 
the same rationale to hold that section 4044(a)(6) required Mead to 
pay the additional benefit gained by using the early retirement actua-
rial reduction before the employer could retain a reversion of excess 
assets. 136 The court distinguished its earlier opinion in Sutton which 
128. ERISA § 4044(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(6) (1982). 
129. 773 F.2d at 1415 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 2618.16 (1984)). 
130. 773 F.2d at 1415 (quoting 40 Fed. Reg. 51368, 51370 (Nov. 4, 1975)), 
131. "[T]he expresssion of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LA w DICTION· 
ARY 521 (5th ed. 1979). See generally w. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 641 (1988), 
132. 773 F.2d at 1416. 
133. 773 F.2d at 1416. 
134. 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988). 
135. 815 F.2d at 991. 
136. 815 F.2d at 992. 
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held that early retirement benefits were not accrued benefits and there-
fore no requirement of payment existed, on the basis that the benefits 
in Sutton were unfunded and contingent.137 
In contrast, other circuits have recently taken the opposite posi-
tion, holding that section 4044(a)(6) does not require payment of early 
retirement benefits. In Blessitt v. Retirement Plan for Employees of 
Dixie Engine Co., 138 employees claimed entitlement not to a more 
favorable calculation of their benefits based on a pro rata share of their 
expected early retirement benefits, but instead to the full, unreduced 
pension benefits that they would have received had the plan termina-
tion not prevented them from working until normal retirement age. 139 
An Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel followed the Amato and 
Tilley courts to hold that the employees were entitled to their unac-
crued, forfeitable benefits.140 It agreed that the proper interpretation 
of section 4044(a)(6) requires that employers use available plan assets 
to meet the employees' "benefit expectations based upon the Plan's full 
benefit structure."141 
However, a petition for rehearing was granted, and the en bane 
court held that the employees were not entitled to any benefits except 
the vested portion of normal retirement benefits which their employer, 
Dixie Engine Company, had already paid.142 The court first stated its 
understanding of the plain meaning of the statute, emphasizing the 
words "under the plan." It explained that these words limit employ-
ees' entitlement to those benefits for which the employees had met all 
of the plan criteria. The court noted that the plan did not promise 
benefits based on expected future years of service.143 Because Dixie 
Engine had paid all benefits for which the employees had met the plan 
criteria, the court found that both IRS regulations and BRISA al-
lowed Dixie Engine to retain excess plan assets consistently with sec-
tion 4044(a)(6). The court also deferred to the IRS and PBGC, both 
of which interpret section 4044(a)(6) as not requiring payment of non-
accrued benefits.144 
In reviewing the case law, the court distinguished Amato and Ti!-
137. 815 F.2d at 991-92. The court also distinguished Sutton because it dealt with a plan 
modification whereas Amato dealt with a plan termination. This does not appear to be a signifi-
cant difference because even in Sutton the employer was eliminating the employees' right to ever 
receive an early retirement benefit once the five year 'grace period' expired. See supra text ac-
companying notes 44-45. 
138. 817 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). 
139. 848 F.2d at 1166-67. 
140. 817 F.2d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir. 1987). 
141. 817 F.2d at 1531 (quoting Amato v. Western Union Intl., Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416 (2d 
Cir. 1985)). 
142. 848 F.2d at 1165-66, 1179. 
143. 848 F.2d at 1169. 
144. 848 F.2d at 1169-71. 
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ley because the employees in Blessitt were seeking credit for years not 
worked whereas the Amato and Tilley courts awarded only benefits 
based on the number of years the employees actually worked. And, 
relying on events which took place subsequent to the plan termination, 
the Eleventh Circuit en bane court cited REA as limiting an em-
ployer's liability to payment for years actually worked. 145 The court 
also relied on public policy considerations. Finally, the court held that 
not requiring payment of non-accrued benefits did not leave category 
six devoid of meaning, and that the Conference Committee change 
could not plausibly show a congressional intent to require employers 
to calculate benefits based on years of service not worked. 146 
The Third Circuit considered the issue of whether BRISA section 
4044(a)(6) requires payment of early retirement benefits in 
Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc., 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan. 141 The 
employee plaintiffs sought early retirement benefits when the closing 
of their plant resulted in the partial termination of both their pension 
plan and their opportunity to meet the requirements for early retire-
ment benefits. 148 The court held that section 4044(a)(6) merely mar-
shals distribution of assets and does not grant substantive rights. It 
agreed with the Blessitt court's view of the plain meaning of section 
4044(a)(6) and noted the opposition by both the PBGC and IRS to 
any interpretation that section 4044(a)(6) requires payment of early 
retirement benefits.149 
Therefore, these court decisions do not provide a uniform interpre-
tation as to whether section 4044(a)(6) requires payment of early re-
tirement benefits before an employer may receive a reversion of excess 
assets. The Second and Fourth Circuits have held that section 
4044(a)(6) requires use of plan assets to meet employees' benefit expec-
tations, including their expectation for early retirement benefits. 150 
However, the Eleventh and Third Circuits have rejected that reason-
ing and held that section 4044(a)(6) does not mandate payment of 
early retirement benefits.151 In an attempt to resolve this disagree-
ment, the next section examines the statutory language and the legisla-
tive history of section 4044(a)(6). 
145. 848 F.2d at 1173-74. 
146. 848 F.2d at 1175-79. 
147. 854 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir. 1988). 
148. 854 F.2d at 1518-19. 
149. 854 F.2d at 1529. 
150. Tilley v. Mead Corp., 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987) cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988); 
Amato v. Western Union Intl., Inc. 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 
474 U.S. 1113 (1986). 
151. Ashenbaugh, 854 F.2d 1516 (3d Cir. 1988); Blessitt v. Retirement Plan for Employees of 
Dixie Engine Co., 817 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1987), vacated, rehg. granted, 836 F.2d 1571 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (en bane), different results reached on rehg., 848 F.2d 1164 (11th Cir. 1988) (en bane). 
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B. Section 4044(a)(6) and Its LegislatiVe History 
The statutory language of section 4044(a)(6) and the legislative his-
tory are ambiguous as to whether early retirement benefits are in-
cluded in the benefits that an employer must pay upon plan 
termination. The plain language of the statute does not resolve the 
question; it is vague and thus supports opposing interpretations. At-
tempting to interpret the language in an internally consistent manner 
does not yield a dispositive answer. The legislative history is equally 
vague; the Conference Committee that wrote the language left no clues 
as to its intent on whether section 4044(a)(6) encompasses early retire-
ment benefits. 
Section 4044(a) prioritizes the order of benefit payments upon plan 
termination.152 This prioritization becomes important when the plan 
does not contain enough assets to pay all of the benefits owed to em-
ployees.153 Section 4044(d)(l) allows employers to retain only those 
excess assets remaining after the employer has distributed all plan lia-
bilities in accordance with the distribution requirements of section 
4044(a).154 
By stating in category six that employers must pay "all other bene-
fits under the plan,"155 section 4044(a)(6) appears to indicate that em-
152. § 4044(a) provides in pertinent part: 
§ 4044. Allocation of assets 
(a) Order of priority of participants and beneficiaries In the case of the termination of a 
single-employer defined benefit plan, the plan administrator shall allocate the assets of 
the plan (available to provide benefits) among the participants and beneficiaries of the 
plan in the following order: 
(1) First, to that portion of each individual's accured [sic] benefit which is derived from 
the participant's contributions to the plan which were not mandatory contributions. 
(2) Second, to that portion of each individual's accrued benefit which is derived from 
the participant's mandatory contributions. 
(3) Third, in the case of benefits payable as an annuity -
(4) Fourth-
(A) to all other benefits (if any) of individuals under the plan guaranteed under this 
subchapter (determined without regard to section 1322(b)(5) of this title), and 
(B) to the additional benefits (if any) which would be determined under subpara-
graph (A) if sectionl322(b)(6) of this title did not apply. 
For purposes of this paragraph, section 1321 of this title shall be applied 
without regard to subsection (c) thereof. 
(5) Fifth, to all other nonforfeitable benefits under the plan. 
(6) Sixth, to all other benefits under the plan. 
ERISA § 4044(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1982). 
153. The prioritization scheme of§ 4044(a) functions in a way similar to § 507 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Bankruptcy Code ensures that 
certain classes of claims, thought to be more deserving, are paid in full before other, less deserv-
ing, claims receive any payment. See generally 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL ~ 507.01 (L. 
King 3d ed. 1988). 
154. For the language ofERISA § 4044(d)(l) see supra text accompanying note 7. Even the 
Blessitt en bane court acknowledged that this means an employer must distribute all assets re-
quired by categories 1-6. ("Any assets remaining after satisfaction of all liabilities in Categories 
1-6 can revert to the employer .... ") 848 F.2d 1164, 1169 (11th Cir. 1988). 
155. ERISA § 4044(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(6) (1982). 
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ployers must pay employees all benefits. This would include early 
retirement benefits when a plan specifically makes provision for such 
benefits. However, the import of the language "under the plan"156 is 
unclear. The en bane court in Blessitt held that this language excluded 
unaccrued benefits for employees who do not meet the plan's eligibility 
requirements when the plan is terminated. 157 This interprets the sec-
tion to deny actively benefits to employees who are too young or have 
too little service, or both, to qualify for early retirement benefits at the 
time the employer terminates the plan. Alternatively, section 
4044(a)(6) may merely be a ranking provision, simply ordering the 
distribution of those benefits which BRISA guarantees elsewhere. 
Interpreting category six as excluding unaccrued benefits could 
render it meaningless if all accrued benefits are covered by categories 
one through five and if employers need pay only accrued benefits. Cat-
egory five requires payment of "all other nonforfeitable benefits 
•••• "158 Thus, in termination situations, category five arguably acts as 
a "clean up" category covering all accrued benefits because I.R.C. sec-
tion 41l(d)(3) requires that upon termination all accrued benefits be-
come nonforfeitable. 159 An interpretation, then, that category six only 
encompasses accrued benefits violates the canon of statutory construc-
tion that statutory provisions should be read with an effort to give 
them some reasonable content, since it may be presumed that Con-
gress wrote the provision for a purpose.160 If this interpretation of 
category five is correct, category six should be read as pertaining to 
some non-accrued benefits, such as early retirement benefits. 
However, categories one through five do not cover accrued, forfeit-
able benefits that become nonforfeitable as a result of plan termina-
tion. Categories one through four clearly exclude these benefits. 161 
Category five also excludes benefits that become nonforfeitable as a 
result of plan termination. 162 Therefore, category six must cover ac-
crued, forfeitable benefits that become nonforfeitable by termination of 
the plan. Category six requires only that the benefits arise under the 
plan.163 Because category six governs payment of accrued, forfeitable 
156. ERISA § 4044(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(6) (1982). 
157. 848 F.2d at 1169. 
158. ERISA § 4044(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(5) (1982). 
159. l.R.C. § 411(d)(3) (1988). 
160. Platt v. Union Pac. R.R., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1878) ("Congress is not presumed to have used· 
words for no purpose. . . . [T]he admitted rules of statutory construction declare that a legisla· 
ture is presumed to have used no superfluous words. Courts are to accord a meaning, if possible, 
to every word in a statute."). 
161. See supra note 152 for the text of§ 4044(a)(l)·(4). 
162. 29 C.F.R. § 2618.2 (1987) (stating that "[b]enefits that become nonforfeitable solely as a 
result of the termination of a plan will be considered forfeitable"). Note, however, that this result 
is dictated, not by the language of the statute, but by an IRS regulation. 
163. These would include any nonvested benefits where the plan provided for 100% vesting 
of nonvested benefits upon plan termination. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief for the National 
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benefits that become nonforfeitable due to termination, category six 
would not be rendered a nullity by interpreting it as excluding unac-
crued benefits. Thus, no need exists for interpreting category six to 
include unaccrued benefits. However, as noted earlier, the statutory 
language does not clearly exclude unaccrued benefits. 
The Amato 164 and Tilley 165 courts placed great emphasis on the 
BRISA Conference Committee's change in the language of section 
4044(a)(6). Those courts interpreted the change as an indication that 
"all other benefits" truly means all benefits. The House version of 
BRISA included a category (d) which required payment of "other ac-
crued benefits." The Conference Committee retained similar language 
in what is now category six, but, most significantly, dropped the word 
"accrued."166 On the surface, this appears to indicate that the Confer-
ence Committee meant the category to encompass unaccrued benefits, 
such as early retirement benefits, for which the employees had not nec-
essarily met all the plan criteria. 
Nonetheless, this interpretation is inconclusive. First, a Confer-
ence Committee's unexplained changes in a bill do not always serve as 
a reliable indicator of congressional intent. 167 Second, it is possible 
that the Conference Committee's deletion of the word accrued was 
simply inadvertent.168 Finally, requiring payment of benefits for 
which the employees had not met the plan's requirements represents a 
significant change from the House and Senate versions. The Senate 
version allowed reversion to the employer after the employer distrib-
uted all employee contributions, "benefits in pay status at least 3 
years," and "other insured benefits."169 Under this language, employ-
ees would have received only their insured, accrued benefits. The 
House version, . though more liberal than the Senate version, would 
only have required distribution of the earnings on. employee contribu-
tions and any special benefits which the plan explicitly offered to pay 
upon termination of the plan in addition to accrued benefits.170 There-
Employee Benefits Institute at 20, Blessit v. Retirement Plan for Employees of Dixie Engine Co., 
848 F.2d 1164 (11th Cir. 19.88) (No. 86-8123). 
164. 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 414 U.S. 1113 (1986). 
165. 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. gran.ted, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988). 
166. Tilley, 815 F.2d at 991-92; Amato, 773 F.2d at 1416. 
167. Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 61 (1947). The critical issue in that case in-
volved the interpretation of a provision of§ 8(c) of the Selective Training & Service Act of 1940 
which had apparently been modified in the Conference Committee. The Court indicated that the 
reasons for the change were indeterminate and that "[t]he interpretation of statutes cannot safely 
be made to rest upon mute intermediate legislative maneuvers." 331 U.S. at 61. 
168. Cf. Justice White's suggestion in his dissent to denial of certiorari in Watt v. Homes 
Limestone Co., 456 U.S. 995, 996 (1982), that the Conference Committee's omission of the word 
"only" from the final version may have been inadvertent. 
169. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5154. 
170. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5154. 
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fore, reading section 4044(a)(6) as requiring payment of unlimited 
benefit expectations dramatically expands the coverage of the section 
over the narrower versions of the section sent to the Conference Com-
mittee by both the Senate and the House. In other sections, where the 
Conference Committee made substantial changes to the House and 
Senate proposals, they carefully explained the changes.171 It seems 
likely that they would have done the same thing with section 
4044(a)(6) had they meant to cause a change of the significance of 
adding mandatory payment of large dollar amounts of unaccrued ben-
efits such as early retirement benefits. However, even without inter-
preting section 4044(a)(6) as covering unaccrued benefits, 4044(a) as a 
whole covers more than either the House or the Senate version would 
have. 
This examination of the statutory language and legislative history 
shows that evidence exists for interpreting the statute either way. 
Those in favor of a broad interpretation, which would require pay-
ment of early retirement benefits, can point to the words "all other 
benefits"172 and the Conference Committee's deletion of the word ac-
crued from what ultimately became category (6). Those desiring to 
limit the scope of section 4044(a)(6) so that it does not require pay-
ment of early retirement benefits, can rely on the words "under the 
plan, " 173 and the lack of any explanation by the Conference Commit-
tee for its deletion of the word "accrued." Because the language and 
legislative history174 do not provide the basis for a clear interpretation, 
the next section turns to a review of the administrative regulations that 
deal with section 4044(a)(6) and the agencies' interpretation of those 
regulations. 
C. IRS and PBGC Regulations 
Both the PBGC and the IRS interpret their regulations to mean 
that section 4044(a)(6) does not require an employer to pay any early 
retirement benefits. In this situation, the courts should accord great 
deference to the interpretations of.the agencies responsible for admin-
istration of statutory programs. 
BRISA requires that until employers satisfy all plan liabilities, they 
171. See H.R. CONF. REP. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5049-59 (description of conference substitute on vesting provisions); id. at 
5063-74 (committee states that it basically adopted the House's funding requirements and care-
fully explains its modifications). Compare the committee's treatment of§ 4044(a)'s distribution 
provisions, where the committee merely summarizes the House and Senate provisions and then 
states, without explanation, its final version. Id. at 5154-55. 
172. ERISA § 4044(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(6) (1982) (emphasis added). 
173. ERISA § 4044(a)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(6) (1982) (emphasis added). 
174. Justice Scalia might have us tum directly from the statutory language to the agencies' 
regulations and their interpretations. See Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. 
L. REv. 20, 45-46 (1988). A complete discussion of statutory interpretation theories is beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
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use plan assets for the "exclusive benefit of [their] employees .... " 175 
However, once the employer satisfies all liabilities, the employer may 
retain excess assets if the specified conditions of section 4044( d)(l) are 
met. 176 The regulations promulgated by the IRS and the PBGC that 
deal with these statutory provisions do not clearly resolve the issue of 
whether early retirement benefits are among those liabilities that an 
employer must satisfy before receiving a reversion. 
Treasury Regulation 1.401-2(b), interpreting section 40l(a)(2), 
provides that employers may not recover surplus assets unless the sur-
plus results from actuarial error. 177 This regulation has a sensible pur-
pose, well grounded in ERISA's goals. If the employer truly erred in 
making contributions, the premise underlying a defined benefit plan, 
which requires that employers fund only in order to meet the future 
benefit entitlement of employees, implies that it is logical to allow the 
employer to recover mistaken contributions. However, if ERISA or 
the employer's funding methodology requires the employer to fund 
benefits such as early retirement benefits prior to accrual, then the sur-
plus that results upon termination from those contributions is not due 
to actuarial error. Instead, the surplus results from the employer's 
termination of the plan, which prevented those early retirement bene-
fits from ever accruing. No premise of an ERISA defined benefit pro-
gram requires the distribution of such an excess to the employer. 
However, an IRS revenue ruling effectively defines all excess assets 
as resulting from actuarial error by permitting the employer to use the 
valuation of benefits in "determining whether there is any surplus due 
to actuarial error."178 That ruling means that no restriction exists on 
an employer's ability to recover excess assets based on the origin of the 
excess. The revenue ruling appears inconsistent with the language of 
the regulation, which states that assets do not result from actuarial 
error if they are the "result of a change in the benefit provisions or in 
the eligibility requirements of the plan."179 In summary, the regula-
tion attempts, consistent with ERISA's pill-poses in regulating defined 
benefit plans, to prohibit employers from recovering plan assets unless 
their contributions were made in error. However, the revenue ruling 
175. I.R.C. § 40l(a)(2) (1982). The pertinent part of that section reads that a pension plan 
cannot qualify under ERISA unless "it is impossible, at any time prior to the satisfaction of all 
liabilities with respect to employees and their beneficiaries under the trust, for any part of the 
corpus or income to be .•. used for, or diverted to, purposes other than for the exclusive benefit 
of his employees •.•. " I.R.C. § 40l(a)(2) (1982). Similarly, ERISA states that "(e]xcept as 
provided [in the sections relating to termination], ... the assets of a plan shall never inure to the 
benefit of any employer ...• " ERISA § 403(c)(l), 29 U.S.C. § l 103(c)(l) (1982). 
176. ERISA § 4044(d)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(l) (1982). 
177. Treas. Reg. § l.401-2(b) (as amended in 1981). 
178. Rev. Rul. 83-52 1983-1 C.B. 87. This replaced earlier, supposedly ambiguous, rulings 
which also stated that surplus may be considered as resulting from actuarial error: 71-152, 1971-
1 C.B. 127. 73-55, 1973-1 C.B. 196. 
179. Treas. Reg. § l.401-2(b)(l) (as amended in 1981). 
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interpreting that regulation seems to deprive the regulation of any real 
force. Such an interpretation might suggest that the IRS approves of 
employers recouping large amounts of excess assets. The IRS, how-
ever, effectively limits its definition of excess assets by interpreting 
early retirement benefits as accrued benefits, thus requiring their pay-
ment out of what might otherwise be excess assets.180 
Another ambiguous regulation is 29 C.F.R. 2618.16 which pur-
, ports to explain the requirements of category six.181 The preamble to 
the proposed regulation defines category six as containing "the value 
of accrued forfeitable benefits."182 It is possible to interpret this, as 
does the PBGC, 183 to mean that category six pertains only to accrued 
benefits. However, this language does not necessarily limit the scope 
of category six· to only accrued benefits. 184 It is logically consistent 
that category six could also pertain to non-accrued benefits such as 
early retirement benefits. In contrast, the regulation itself states that 
"[t]he benefits assigned to priority category 6 ... are all of the partici-
pant's benefits under the plan, whether forfeitable or nonforfeit-
able." 185 This language is subject to the same conflicting 
interpretations as the actual language of section 4044(a)(6). Does "all 
benefits" mean all of the benefits that a participant could ever hope to 
receive? Or does "under the plan" mean that the only benefits covered 
are those for which the employee has met all of the plan's criteria? 
Also, what is the effect of including nonforfeitable benefits? Because 
this regulation and its proposed preamble are hopelessly ambiguous, 
they are of no significant help in defining the contours of category six 
coverage. 
Yet other regulations and revenue rulings appear to allow the em-
ployer to receive a reversion of excess assets without paying early re-
tirement benefits to employees who do not qualify for those benefits 
under the plan. The jointly issued guidelines on terminations state 
that employers must protect only participants' accrued benefits against 
risk. 186 Similarly, revenue rulings have only required employers to 
180. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
181. 29 C.F.R. § 2618.16 (1987). 
182. 40 Fed. Reg. 51368, 51370 (1975). Although the PBGC did not include this preamble 
in the final regulation, the final regulation stated that the changes in the rules pertaining to 
categories 4 through 6 had been made only for purposes of clarification. 46 Fed. Reg. 9480, 9485 
0~~ ' 
183. For a discu5sion of the positions of the various agencies, see infra notes 188-91 and 
accompanying text. 
184. See Amato v. Western Union Intl., Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1415-16 (2d Cir. 1985). 
185. 29 C.F.R. § 2618.16 (1987). 
186. The Guidelines werejointly issued by the IRS, PBGC, and the Department of Labor to 
clarify an employer's right to receive a reversion upon plan termination. 2 G. BOREN, supra note 
4, at § 17:15 (1988 Supp). In pertinent part, the Guidelines state: 
[W]hen an employer terminates a defined benefit pension plan, it may not recover any sur-
plus assets until it has fully vested all participants' benefits and has purchased and distrib-
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distribute accrued benefits.181 
Both the IRS and the PBGC interpret the statutory language and 
their regulations as not requiring payment of early retirement benefits 
under category six.188 The IRS's position is not inconsistent with its 
interpretation that funded and non-contingent benefits of the type at 
issue in Amato are accrued benefits. 189 Inclusion of all early retire-
ment benefits under section 4044(a)(6) would extend the payment re-
quirement beyond what is required by· the IRS's position on accrued 
benefits. For example, the IRS's interpretation of accrued benefits ap-
parently would not require payment of unfunded, contingent bene-
fits.190 However, including all early retirement benefits under section 
4044(a)(6) might require payment of Sutton-type, and possibly even 
Blessit-type, benefits, a far more inclusive requirement. 
The PBGC recently stated in an opinion letter: 
Section 4044(a) does not create benefit entitlements not otherwise pro-
vided for elsewhere in BRISA or under the plan .... Section 4044(a)(6) 
accordingly does not require the allocation of assets to pay benefits that 
might have accrued in the future if the Plans had not terminated and the 
participants had continued performing covered service. Consequently, 
such "unaccrued benefits" cannot be considered "liabilities of the plan to 
uted annuity contracts, to protect participants against the risk that their accrued benefits 
may be jeopardized .... 
PBGC, IRS, and Labor Department Guidelines on Asset Reversions, 11 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 724 
(May 28, 1984) (emphasis added). 
187. Rev. Rul. 80-229, 1980-2 C.B. 133, 134 ("If the assets as of the date of termination 
exceed the present value of the accrued benefits (whether or not forfeitable) as of such date, the 
plan will not be considered discriminatory if such excess reverts to the employer ... "). See also 
Rev. Rul. 83-52, 1983-1 C.B. 87. 
188. Brief for the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation as Amicus Curie in Support of the 
Petition at 2, Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 815 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1987) (No. 87-1868), cert. granted, 109 
S. Ct 52 (1988). See Blessit v. Retirement Plan for Employees of Dixie Engine Co., 848 F.2d 
1164, 1171 (11th Cir. 1988) (en bane) ("The three agencies charged with administering ERISA 
- the PBGC, the IRS, and the Department of Labor - all concur that benefit a~rual ceases 
when a plan terminates."). After the Tilley decision, the IRS suspended termination determina-
tions in the Fourth Circuit in order to review the decision. Plan Terminations on Hold in Fourth, 
Eleventh Circuits, 14 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1107 (August 24, 1987). The IRS later lifted the suspen-
sion. Suspension Lifted on Approvals of Terminations in Two Circuits, 14 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1311 
(October 5, 1987). It then appeared that the IRS would not follow either the Tilley or Blessitt 
reasoning and, therefore, would not require payment of early retirement benefits upon plan ter-
minations. Royster, How Does the Blessitt Decision Affect Plan Sponsors?, PENSION WORLD 52, 
56 (November, 1987). Finally, the Treasury Department announced that the IRS would not 
issue, until at least May, determination letters on applications filed after October 24, 1988 to 
terminate defined benefit plans with excess assets, where the employer planned to recover even a 
portion of those excess assets. Suspension of Determination Letters for Terminations Announced 
by Treasury, 15 Pens. Rep (BNA) 1876 (October 31, 1988). Compare the IRS's suspension of 
termination approvals in the Eleventh Circuit and subsequent refusal to follow the Blessitt panel 
decision. 
189. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
190. For example, the type at issue in Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. of Natl. Steel Corp., 724 
F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984}; see supra text accompanying notes 
45-48. ' 
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participants and their beneficiaries" under Section 4044(d)(l).191 
Arguably, courts should not defer to the PBGC's interpretation of cat-
egory six because the PBGC does not guarantee payment of benefits 
that become nonforfeitable "solely because of the termination of the 
plan"192 and therefore has no special expertise or authority regarding 
category six. Yet, at the same time that it established the PBGC, Con-
gress explicitly granted it broad administrative and regulatory pow-
ers.193 In BRISA section 4041, Congress explicitly granted the PBGC 
power to supervise the termination of pension plans by plan adminis-
trators.194 Consequently, deference to the PBGC is appropriate. 
Generally, when the meaning of a statute is unclear, courts should 
accord great deference to the interpretation of the agency, or agencies, 
charged with administration of the statute in question.195 The courts 
have accorded particular deference to the PBGC in its interpretation 
of ERISA's provisions.196 All of the traditional reasons for judicial 
deference to the responsible agency's interpretation support deference 
to the PBGC and the IRS. In this regard, judges often have less exper-
tise than do the responsible agencies, particularly in technical and 
complex statutory schemes like ERISA.197 Also, judicial deference to 
federal agencies increases uniformity because the Supreme Court's 
limited docket restricts the number of cases it can review. 198 Absent 
191. PBGC Opinion Letter No. 87-11, 15 PENS. REP. (BNA) 259, (February 1, 1988). 
192. 2 G. BOREN, supra note 4, at§ 17.20. 
193. ERISA § 4002, 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982). 
194. ERISA § 4041, 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). 
195. "If ... the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at 
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute. • . . Rather, ••• the 
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984). See also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555 (1980) ("The Court has often 
repeated the general proposition that considerable respect is due 'the interpretation given [a] 
statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.' " (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 
380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965))). 
196. See, e.g., Belland v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 726 F.2d 839, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 880 (1984) ("PBGC's interpretation of ERISA is entitled to great defer-
ence."); Concord Control, Inc. v. International Union, UAW, 647 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1981), 
cert.denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (citing the Connolly court's standard of great deference to the PBGC's 
interpretation); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 581 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir. 1978), 
cert.denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979) ("[T]he determination of the PBGC •.. is entitled to great 
deference in the construction and application of ERISA."). 
197. Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 
(1984). Paul Fassar, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Labor-Management Relations, stated 
in May of 1975 that the employees "at the Labor Department, ... charged with administering a 
good portion of [ERISA] can indeed substantiate the statement that ERISA is one of the most 
complex laws ever enacted by Congress." Fassar, The New Pension Law, 28 PROC. N.Y.U. 
CoNF. ON LAB. 59 (1975). Based on my informal conversations during interviewing season, it 
would be an understatement to say that many practitioners agree. 
198. See, e.g., Milhol/in, 444 U.S. at 568 n.12 ("[L]itigation is not always the optimal process 
by means of which to formulate a coherent and predictable body of technical rules."); Strauss, 
One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources 
for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1118-22 (1987). 
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Supreme Court review, a single federal agency can better achieve uni-
form interpretations of federal statutes than can thirteen federal cir-
cuits.199 Uniformity possesses many virtues, including allowing 
companies to conform their conduct to the law and ensuring that they 
are not subject to conflicting requirements. The only question that the 
courts need ask regarding an agency's interpretation is whether that 
interpretation is "based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute. "200 Section 4044(a)(6)'s ambiguity permits reliance on the inter-
pretation given it by the agencies responsible for its enforcement. 
Although the regulations do not clearly resolve the issue, both the 
PBGC and the IRS believe that section 4044(a)(6) does not require 
payment of early retirement benefits. Their interpretations are entitled 
to great deference. 
In summary, the circuit courts are in conflict and the statutory 
language and legislative history are ambiguous with regard to the 
questions of (1) whether BRISA includes early retirement benefits in 
its definition of accrued benefits and (2) whether section 4044(a)(6) 
requires payment of early retirement benefits. However, the courts 
should defer to the unanimous interpretation of the agencies charged 
with BRISA administration that section 4044(a)(6) does not require 
payment of non-accrued benefits. 
IV. THE PURPOSES OF BRISA AND PUBLIC POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Although section 4044(a)(6) does not require payment of early re-
tirement benefits, it remains unclear whether early retirement benefits 
are in fact accrued benefits. The agencies have not yet agreed on that 
issue, so their interpretations cannot be considered dispositive. In de-
termining whether accrued benefits should be interpreted to include 
early retirement benefits, thereby requiring payment of those benefits 
upon plan terminations, it becomes important to assess the public pol-
icy issues involved. 
This Part examines the policy considerations bearing on whether 
BRISA should be read to require employers to pay early retirement 
benefits upon plan termination. The first section analyzes whether 
such a requirement may cause employers to stop offering early retire-
ment benefits as part of their defined benefit plans or to switch to de-
fined contribution plans. The second section discusses whether 
employers would decrease funding of their plans to a dangerously low 
level. The third section reviews the appropriateness of awarding retro-
active relief. The fourth section examines whether payment of early 
retirement benefits will necessarily result in younger, shorter service 
199. Strauss, supra note 198, at' 1121-22. 
200. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
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employees receiving a disproportionate share of plan assets at the ex-
pense of older, longer service employees. The fifth section explores the 
debate over who would be unjustly enriched by receiving the dollars 
that employers contributed to fund early retirement plans: employers 
or employees. Finally, this Part considers expectations of employees, 
the contractual nature of early retirement plans, and ERISA's status 
as remedial legislation. 
A. Availability of Early Retirement and Defined Benefit Plans 
If ERISA requires employers to pay out early retirement benefits 
upon plan termination, employers may stop offering early retirement 
benefits. Also, requiring use of otherwise excess assets to pay such 
benefits might encourage employers to set up defined contribution 
plans instead of defined benefit plans, or even to offer no pension plan 
at all.201 Either of these employer responses would be bad for 
employees. 
Two reasons might cause an employer to substitute a defined con-
tribution plan for a defined benefit plan. First, if the employer termi-
nates a defined benefit plan, receives a reversion, and institutes a new 
defined benefit plan, the employer takes a risk that the IRS will find 
that the termination was just a sham to continue effectively the origi-
nal plan while depleting it of excess assets.202 When the IRS makes 
such a finding, the employer is not allowed to keep the reversion.203 
Therefore, it is safer for employers to set up defined contribution plans 
after terminating a defined 'benefit plan; such a move makes it clear 
that the new defined contribution plan is not a continuation of the old 
defined benefit plan.204 
Second, in defined benefit plans employers bear all the investment 
risk.2°5 Employers may decide not to bear that risk if they are also 
effectively precluded from benefiting from any potential investment 
gain because they always must use excess funds upon termination to 
pay early retirement benefits. By turning to a defined contribution 
201. See Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co, 614 F. Supp. 694, 710 (N.D. Ala. 1985), affd., 199 F.2d 
1464 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481U.S.1016 (1987) (ERISA does not require private com-
panies to adopt a pension plan for their employees.); S. KAMERMAN & A. KAHN, THE REsPON· 
SIVE WORKPLACE: EMPLOYERS AND A CHANGING LABOR FORCE 51 (1987) ("[A]bout half the 
private labor force is currently covered by a private ERISA-regulated pension plan and fewer 
than half of this sector now have or believe they will have a vested pension."). See also Penaliz-
ing the Recapture of Surplus Plan Assets Encourages Terminations, Says ASPA to Congress, EM· 
PLOYEE BENEF. PLAN REV. 32, 34 (July 1984) [hereinafter ASPA]. ASPA refers to the 
American Society of Pension Actuaries. 
202. Pepper & Perlmuter, Accessibility of Surplus Pension Assets, J. OF PENSION PLANNING 
& COMPLIANCE 229, 233-34 (1985). 
203. Id. at 234. 
204. Id. at 233. Pepper & Perlmuter note that defined contribution plans are sufficiently 
different from defined benefit plans that one is clearly not the equivalent of the other. 
205. See supra note 4. 
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plan the employer can avoid bearing the risk of loss but does not re-
ceive any gain because contribution is fixed. 
Defined benefit plans are generally better for employees than de-
fined contribution plans. In defined contribution plans, the employees 
bear all the investment risk.206 This results in uncertainty regarding 
the amount of the employees' ultimate benefit entitlements and 
thereby undermines ERISA's goal of increasing employees' certainty 
in their retirement income. 207 Also, a defined benefit plan typically 
pays benefits on a monthly or annual basis. This is consistent with 
ERISA's goal of ensuring lifetime incomes, whereas the typical de-
fined contribution plan pays benefits in a lump sum - far less effec-
tively ensuring lifetime income.208 In general, defined benefit plans 
provide better retirement benefits than any other type of private retire-
ment plan, and any change which decreases their use would ultimately 
have negative effects on retirees. 209 · 
However, employers may have independent reasons for continuing 
sponsorship of defined benefit plans and including early retirement 
benefits in those plans. These reasons may offset any of the disincen-
tives that result from requiring payment of early retirement benefits 
upon plan terminations. 210 For example, the employer's collective 
bargaining agreement often requires employer sponsorship of such . 
plans.211 Also, practically, when negotiated agreements require such 
plans, few employers will offer less attractive plans to their nonunion 
employees. Most employers hesitate to give nonunion employees such 
a clear incentive to unionize. 
Strong pension programs also may enhance companie8' abilities to 
"attract and retain younger and more productive workers and to ease 
older and presumably less productive workers out of the firm."212 An-
other benefit accrues to employers through use of defined benefit plans, 
according to many compensation experts, because favorable and relia-
ble benefit plans increase employee morale.213 Similarly, attractive 
206. See supra note 4. 
207. See Note, supra note 2, at 814. 
208. See supra,note 4. 
209. Grubbs, supra note 4, at 200. 
210. Also, at least one commentator has questioned whether national policy does, or should, 
favor defined benefit plans over defined contribution plans. Stein, Raider:s of the Corporate Pen-
sion Plan: The Rever:sion of Excess Plan Assets to the Employer, 5 AM. J. TAX POLY. 117, 172 
(1986). 
211. Id. This argument is mitigated somewhat by the fact that the typical collective bargain-
ing agreement only lasts two to three years. Conversation with T. J. St. Antoine, James E. and 
Sarah Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan (March 6, 1989). Cf General Cable 
Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1127 (1962) (changing the NLRB's contract-bar rule from two to 
three years partially because of the prevalence of three year contracts). 
212. Olian, Carroll & Schneier, Pension Plans: the Human Resource Management Per:spec-
tive, 9 KEY lssuES No. 28 (1985). 
213. Stein, supra note 210, at 172. See generally S. KAMERMAN & A. KAHN, supra note 201, 
at 49 ("Employees themselves view entitlement to a pension as the second most important benefit 
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benefit plans may increase employee retention. 214 
Also, the true purpose of some plans might be to give strong bene-
fits to key employees, especially in the case of small businesses. Such 
benefits are funded with expectations of large benefit payouts, not with 
the hope of reversion to the contributing employer.215 Finally, em-
ployers may not put great weight on the potential for future excess 
asset recovery when deciding whether to establish an employee benefit 
plan, or which type of plan to choose.216 Therefore, it is at least ques-
tionable whether requiring payment of early retirement benefits upon 
plan termination will result in substantial numbers of employers com-
pletely eschewing benefit plans or turning to defined contribution 
plans. 
B. Ensuring Appropriate Plan Funding 
BRISA allows employers significant leeway in funding their plans. 
If opportunities for employers to :receive reversions are limited by re-
quiring employers to pay more benefits upon plan termination, em-
ployers may take advantage of ERISA's flexible funding requirements 
and reduce their plan funding.217 Reduced funding could result in 
plans with insufficient funds to pay even regular retirement benefits. 
The crux of this argument is that employers who know that they can 
receive any excess that results from liberal funding will be more will-
ing to put tax-deferred dollars into pension plans than employers who 
know that they will not receive any resulting excess. Employers may 
be less likely to make contributions before absolutely necessary if they 
know that the likelihood of receiving a reversion upon plan termina-
tion is limited because they must pay out large amounts in early retire-
ment benefits. 
Reduced plan funding would have two negative consequences. 
First, it would decrease plan security - at least for those benefits not 
guaranteed by the PBGC.218 Second, increasing the number of un-
derfunded plans could increase the amount payable by the PBGC 
they receive at work, after health and medical insurance; they also rank it second on their list of 
benefits they most desire to see improved."); R. MCCAFFERY, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 
10 (1988) (citing a Hewitt Associates survey showing that 28% of employees rate benefits as 
more important than pay, another 56% rate benefits and pay equally, while only 16% rate bene-
fits as of less importance than pay.). 
214. 1 G. BOREN, supra note 4, at § 3.22. 
215. Stein, supra note 210, at 172. However, ERISA limits the proportion of benefits that 
key employees may receive as compared to non-key employees. See 1 G. BOREN, supra note 4, at 
§ 3.25. 
216. Stein, supra note 210, at 172. 
217. See, e.g., Holliday v. Xerox Corp., 732 F.2d 548, 552 (6th Cir. 1984); Eager v. Savannah 
Foods & Indus. Inc., 605 F. Supp. 415, 420 (N.D. Ala. 1984); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 
441 F. Supp 1128, 1132-33 (E.D. Pa. 1977); ASPA, supra note 201, at 32. 
218. See Note, supra note 2, at 820. 
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through its plan guarantees.219 Because the PBGC is already severely 
in debt,220 its ability to meet additional liabilities is uncertain. 
However, requiring payment of early retirement benefits need not 
result in underfunded plans. It may be that employers do not choose 
their funding methods with an eye toward potential reversions .. In-
stead, an employer may genuinely be concerned about providing 
funded benefits for its employees.221 Or, the employer may realize that 
making tax credited contributions to a plan early, and allowing those 
contributions to increase on a tax deferred basis for a longer number of 
years, reduces the cost to the employer of any given defined benefit. 222 
Furthermore, BRISA currently requires that employers at least con-
form with minimum funding standards to protect employees and the 
PBGC against inadequate funding. If requiring employers to pay 
early retirement benefits upon plan termination results in less responsi-
ble funding and ERISA's current minimum funding requirements do 
not fully protect employees and the PBGC, Congress can easily ad-
dress that problem by , setting stricter funding standards. 223 
C. Retroactive Awards in Pension Cases 
The Court has sometimes been reluctant to grant retroactive reme-
dies in pension plan cases. In Title Vll224 cases, the Court has formu-
lated a three prong test to determine the appropriateness of retroactive 
awards. The three criteria that must be met to preclude a retroactive 
award are: 
[1.] [W]hether the decision established a new principle of law .... 
[2.] whether retroactive awards are necessary to the operation of Title 
VII principles by acting to deter deliberate violations or grudging 
compliance. 
[3.] whether retroactive liability will produce inequitable results for the 
States, employers, retirees, and pension funds affected by [the 
court's] decision.225 · 
Application of this test in a nmp.ber of Title VII pension cases prohib-
219. See id. 
220. In its 1984 annual report, the PBGC reported a deficit of $462 million. 1984 PENS. 
BEN. GUAR. CoRP. ANN. REP. at 3. 
221. For a discussion of why employers desire healthy benefit plans, see supra notes 211-16 
and accompanying text. 
222. Stein, supra note 210, at 173. 
223. See 1 G. BOREN, supra note 4 at § 9. Cf. Amato v. Western Union Intl., Inc., 773 F.2d 
1402, 1414 (2d Cir. 1985) (dismissing the district court's concern that not allowing the employer 
to receive the surplus at issue would encourage insufficient pension plan funding by stating that 
"[t]his concern is diminished by ERISA's provisions insuring at least minimum funding."). 
224. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2-3 (1982)). These cases involved claimants seeking pension plan 
amendments. The courts refused to award retroactive relief because of the unique nature of 
pension plans. See cases noted infra note 226. 
225. Florida v. Long, 108 S. Ct. 2354, 2359 (1988). 
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iting gender discrimination in actuarial tables has led the court to deny 
retroactive awards. 226 
This three prong test does not restrict requiring retroactive pay-
ment of early retirement benefits by employers who terminated plans 
before the 1984 REA clarification. Admittedly, the situation passes 
prong one; the issue of law is a difficult one and a reasonable plan 
administrator could have believed that BRISA did not require pay-
ment of early retirement benefits. Applying the second prong, retroac-
tive awards are not necessary for future enforcement; no problems of 
willful noncompliance are expected. Nonetheless, requiring payment 
of early retirement benefits upon plan termination fails the third prong 
of the Court's test. The Court established the third prong primarily to 
·avoid jeopardizing the continuing viability of pension plans and to 
avoid unduly burdening current contributors by requiring them to pay 
not only their current share but also that portion of court mandated 
benefits that was not funded in the past.227 In contrast, most of the 
early retirement benefits at issue here were funded. No payments 
would be made that were not funded. At most, the courts will require 
companies to turn over to employees those funds that the companies 
originally' voluntarily set aside in pension plans for the purpose of pay-
ing benefits to employees. Also, there is no chance of jeopardizing 
ongoing pension plans because by definition the only plans at issue 
have been terminated at least with respect to the claimants. Therefore, 
since there is no inequitable result, retroactive award of early retire-
ment benefits from terminated plans is not precluded by the Court's 
test. 
D. Guarding the Relative Rights of Employees 
Requiring payment of benefit expectations upon plan termination 
could lead to younger, shorter service employees receiving a dispro-
portionate share of plan assets at the expense of older, longer service 
workers. The Blessitt en bane court found this persuasive, because if 
category six covers both accrued, nonvested benefits228 and nonac-
crued, nonvested benefits, then it would appear that employers would 
allocate equivalent shares to all employees with either type of claim.229 
226. See Long, 108 S. Ct. at 2364 (state of Florida not required to pay retroactive benefits 
where it did not have notice that offering an optional pension plan with sex·based benefits vio· 
lated Title VII); Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensa-
tion Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1105-07 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (state of Arizona 
allowed to pay benefits based on the contributions made prior to the decision though the Court 
required modification of future contributions and benefits); City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 718-23 (1978) (pension plan that distinguished on basis of 
mortality table differentials between men and women found in violation of Title VII, but em· 
ployer not required to make retroactive adjustments in benefits or contributions). 
227. See Long, 463 U.S. at 2361. 
228. See supra text accompanying note 142. 
229. 848 F.2d at 1176. 
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Yet the relative rights of older, longer service employees may be 
protected by other means, such as establishing subcategories of prior-
ity payment. For example, the fiist level subcategory, within category 
six, could require that accrued benefits be paid first. The plan could 
also provide that a lower category of benefits must be paid from funds 
that remain after payment of the higher level benefits. Section 4044(a) 
specifically allows for establishment of such subcategories.230 
E. Excess Assets as Unjustly Enriching Employees or Employers 
Some commentators have argued that permitting employees to re-
ceive the excess assets that remain after plan termination would un-
justly enrich those employees.231 The proponents of this position 
argue that monies that would be used to pay early retirement benefits 
are excess assets. They believe that the excess assets should go to the 
employers rather than unjustly enriching the employees. The argu-
ment relies on the premise that in a defined benefit plan, employees are 
entitled only to accrued benefits - narrowly defined to exclude early 
retirement benefits - and anything extra represents a windfall. 
This argument ignores the statutory and regulatory requirement 
that all assets of the plan inure only to the benefit of participants.232 It 
also conflicts with Congress' purpose in allowing the employer a tax 
deduction for plan contributions. Congress provides that deduction as 
a way of encouraging employers to maintain and fund plans that ulti-
mately result in pension income to retirees.233 As the dissent in 
Ashenbaugh stated, "[w]hile Congress intended this government sub-
sidy to assist retirement saving, its purpose is perverted when the as-
sets thus engendered inure to the plan sponsor rather than to a retiring 
plan participant."234 Furthermore, the unjust enrichment argument 
just as easily cuts the other way: reversion of excess assets to the em-
ployer unjustly enriches the employer. The Amato court in rejecting 
the theory, held that BRISA preempts any state common law claim of 
unjust enrichment.23s 
230. ERISA § 4044(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(6) (1982) ("A plan may establish subclasses 
and categories within the classes described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a) of this 
section in accordance with regulations prescribed by the corporation."). 
231. Stein, supra note 210, at 153 presents this argument. 
232. See supra text accompanying note 175. 
233. Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc., 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516, 1538 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (Mansmann, J., concurring and dissenting); Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Retmt. 
Prog. for Salaried Employees, 740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109 
(1985). See also loppoloto, supra note 4, at 87-88. 
234. 854 F.2d at 1538. . 
235. 773 F.2d at 1419. See also Van Orman v. American Insurance Co., 680 F.2d 301, 311-
14 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that ERISA preempts unjust enrichment claims under federal com-
mon law). See generally Irish & Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory 
Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 109 (1985) (regarding the scope of preemption by ERISA). That 
neither employees nor employers have a formal cause of action has not prevented courts from 
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Theories of unjust enrichment offer little aid in resolving the issue 
of payment of early retirement benefits. Both employees and employ-
ers make logical but not compelling claims that receipt of assets by the 
other side would amount to unjust enrichment. In any case, BRISA 
preemption may moot these arguments.236 
F. Employees' Expectations, the Contractual Nature of Early 
Retirement Benefits, and ERISA as Remedial Legislation 
There are compelling independent policy reasons for requiring em-
ployers to pay early retirement benefits upon plan termination. Em-
ployees legitimately expect to receive the early retirement benefits 
offered in their pension plans. Employees base their expectations, at 
least in part, on the fact that the pension benefits represent a form of 
deferred compensation for services the employees render while ac-
tively employed. These employee expectations should be fulfilled 
before an employer captures excess assets. Moreover, an employer's 
elective pension benefit plan creates contractual obligations that 
should be fu1filled upon plan termination. 
Employers do not give pension plans to their employees gratui-
tously. 237 Instead, pension plans are simply a form of deferred com-
pensation. This was clear to the Congress when it passed BRISA. 
The Senate report recognized that "losses of pension rights are inequi-
table, since the pension contributions previously made on behalf of the 
employee may have been made in lieu of additional compensation or 
some other benefits which he would have received."238 The remarks 
of Senator Harrison Williams, "one of the principal architects of ER-
ISA"239 lend further support. He stated that "pensions are not gratui-
ties .... They represent savings which the worker has earned in the 
form of deferred payment for his labors. "240 The theory of deferred 
compensation is further strengthened when combined with Supreme 
Court recognition of retirement benefits as contractual obligations.241 
relying on the concept of windfalls. In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 
(E.D. Pa. 1977) ("[E]mployees ... will not receive any windfalls due to the employer's mistake in 
predicting the amount necessary to keep the Plan on a sound financial basis."). 
236. See supra note 235 for references that discuss the extent of ERISA's preemption of these 
arguments. 
237. If this was false for publicly held companies, those plans would violate the requirement 
that a corporation must be run for the benefit of its shareholders. Cf. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 
204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). 
238. s. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 4890, 4930. 
239. Ashenbaugh v. Crucible Inc., 1975 Salaried Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516, 1537 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (Mansmann, J., concurring and dissenting). 
240. 119 CoNG. REC. $29995, 30005 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1973). 
241. Florida v. Long, 108 S. Ct. 2354, 2364 (1988) (emphasis added) ("[A] pension plan, 
funded on an actuarial basis, provides benefits fixed under a contract between the employer and 
retiree based on a past assessment of the employee's expected years of service, date of retirement, 
average final salary, and years of projected benefits."). 
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The employer has a contractual duty to pay these benefits even if that 
duty is not explicitly required by ERISA. 
Furthermore, Congress passed ERISA as remedial legislation. As 
in the case of other remedial legislation, the courts should construe 
ERISA to provide maximum protection to the employees that Con-
gress designed it to protect.242 That means construing ERISA, where 
its provisions are unclear, to protect employees' expectations regard-
ing early retirement benefits. _ 
In summary, though some public policy concerns suggest that em-
ployers should not be required to pay early retirement benefits upon 
plan termination, many of those concerns are either illusory or may be 
resolved by congressional or employer action. The only consideration 
remaining is that requiring such payment might cause employers to 
favor defined contribution plans or no plan at all over defined benefit 
plans. While empirical data is not available, this concern is mitigated 
by the opposing considerations stated above. 243 Furthermore, there 
are compelling independent policy reasons for requiring payment of 
early retirement benefits. From a policy perspective then, employers 
should be required to pay funded, noncontingent early retirement ben-
efits as accrued benefits upon plan terminations before the employer 
may receive a reversion of excess assets. 
CONCLUSION 
If early retirement benefits are "accrued benefits," section 4044 
when read in conjunction with section 4ll(d)(3) requires that employ-
ers pay them upon plan termination before the employer may receive a 
reversion of excess assets. However, the circuit courts are split as to 
whether early retirement benefits are accrued benefits. The split is un-
derstandable because the relevant statutory language of ERISA does 
not clearly resolve the question, and the legislative history is ambigu-
ous. While all of the applicable agencies are not clearly in agreement 
on the i~sue, the IRS believes that funded, non-contingent early retire-
ment benefits of the type at issue inAmato 244 are accrued benefits, and 
that ERISA therefore requires employers to pay those benefits upon 
plan termination. 
The distribution requirements of ERISA section 4044(a)(6) could 
be read as requiring payment of early retirement benefits. However, 
all of the agencies involved interpret section 4044(a)(6) as not requir-
ing payment of early retirement benefits. The courts' normal principle 
of deference to interpretations of the agencies responsible for adminis-
242. Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984). 
243. See supra text accompanying notes 211-16. 
244. Amato v. Western Union Intl., Inc., 773 F.2d 1402 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed per 
stipulation, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986). See supra text accompanying note 127. 
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tration of the statute in question should therefore lead to court en-
forcement of the agencies' interpretation. 
Therefore, while section 4044(a)(6) should not be read as requiring 
payment of all early retirement benefits, the IRS's position that 
funded, non-contingent benefits are accrued benefits should be ac-
corded some deference. Also, policy considerations militate in favor 
of requiring payment of early retirement benefits when a plan is termi-
nated. Although some policy implications seem to preclude requiring 
payment of early retirement benefits upon plan termination, these im-
plications lack persuasiveness. Employees have legitimate expecta-
tions that they will have an opportunity to earn early retirement 
benefits. Employees trade current income for the opportunity to re-
ceive those future early retirement benefits. The employer denies the 
employee the opportunity of ever meeting the plan criteria for early 
retirement benefits in many cases where the employer terminates the 
pension plan. Requiring the employer to pay early retirement benefits 
to employees with the funds that the employer originally contributed 
to the plan for that purpose offers a fair solution and certainly lies 
within ERISA's goals of providing reliable retirement benefits. Such a 
requirement is also consistent with ERISA's status as remedial legisla-
tion which should be construed in favor of the employees that it was 
designed to protect. 
- Dana M. Muir 
